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ABSTRACT 
OBJECT RIVALRY: COMPETITION BETWEEN INCOMPATIBLE  
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SAME OBJECT 
 
Nicholas C. Hindy 
 
 
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill 
 
 
To understand that an object has changed state during an event, we must represent the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ states of that object. Because a physical object cannot be in multiple 
states at any one moment in time, these ‘before’ and ‘after’ object states are mutually 
exclusive. In the same way that alternative states of a physical object are mutually 
exclusive, are cognitive representations of alternative object states also incompatible? If 
so, comprehension of an object state-change involves interference between the 
constituent object states. Through a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
experiments, we test the hypothesis that comprehension of object state-change requires 
the cognitive system to resolve conflict between representationally distinct brain states. 
We discover that (1) comprehension of an object state-change evokes a neural response in 
prefrontal cortex that is the same as that found for known forms of conflict, (2) the degree 
to which an object is described as changing in state predicts the strength of the prefrontal 
cortex conflict response, (3) the dissimilarity of object states predicts the pattern 
dissimilarity of visual cortex brain states, and (4) visual cortex pattern dissimilarity 
predicts the strength of the prefrontal cortex conflict response. Results from these 
experiments suggest that distinct and incompatible representations of an object compete 
when representing object state-change. The greater the dissimilarity between described 
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object states, the greater the dissimilarity between rival brain states, and the greater the 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
When the identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a 
somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from those in which 
it last appeared. 
– The Principles of Psychology (William James, 1890) 
 
 Recall a pumpkin that you purchased for Halloween. Focus on how the pumpkin 
looked before you bought it. Now think of how the same pumpkin looked once it was 
carved and on display. Finally, refocus on how this pumpkin looked in its original 
uncarved state.  
 In performing this exercise, many people report difficulty in “letting go” of their 
strong visual memory of the pumpkin as a decoration, as they attempt to refocus their 
attention on the image of the same pumpkin in its original state. To guide intuition about 
this apparent interference between alternative representations of the pumpkin, it may be 
useful to consider a few observations about this object, as it existed in the world. The first 
observation is that the pumpkin was in distinct states at distinct points in time; at one 
point in time the pumpkin was in an uncarved state, while at another point in time the 
pumpkin was in a carved state. The second observation is that the pumpkin was never in 
distinct states at a single point in time; at no point in time was the pumpkin in both an 
uncarved state and a carved state.  
 Observations about mutually exclusive states of a pumpkin are not far from the 
popular metaphor of Schrödinger’s cat (Schrödinger, 1935). Certainly, Schrödinger’s 
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thought experiment was not intended to inform our understanding of the behavior of cats, 
but instead to inform our understanding of the behavior of electrons. In a similar way, the 
experiments described here are not intended to inform our understanding of the 
relationship between incompatible object states, but instead to inform our understanding 
of the relationship between incompatible brain states. As James’ quote suggests, the 
internal representation of a described object such as a pumpkin has an existence that is 
distinct from that of the physical object in the world. We take as self-evident that an 
observable object such as a pumpkin cannot be in multiple states at any one moment in 
time. We ask whether the brain states which correspond to those alternative object states 
are similarly incompatible, and if so, whether comprehension of an object state-change 
thus requires the cognitive system to resolve conflict among representationally distinct 
brain states. 
In the empirical chapters that follow, we use functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to measure the extent to which alternative object representations 
compete when an object is changed from its original state. However, we recognize that 
any productive investigation of a neural system must begin with a description of the 
system’s purpose, as well as a mechanistic framework of cognitive processes through 
which the neural system achieves this purpose (Marr & Poggio, 1979; Marr, 1982). 
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, we will review literature on how the cognitive 
system maintains information in working memory, detects conflict between incompatible 
items of information, and resolves conflict among those items. These concepts will both 
motivate the forthcoming experiments and guide the interpretation of data in Chapters 2 
and 3.  
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Ambiguity in Language and in the World 
 Ambiguity is not unique to pumpkins, Schrödinger cats, or electrons. It is present 
anytime a single object, symbol, or idea maps onto to multiple distinct referents. This 
correspondence problem is particularly salient in language comprehension. Many words 
do not have a one-to-one mapping between form and meaning. A long history of 
psycholinguistic research has demonstrated the presence of ambiguity at nearly every 
level of linguistic processing. At the most basic levels of speech and text comprehension, 
multiple phonemes are simultaneously activated when the voice onset time of a stimulus 
does not strongly cohere to a particular phonetic category (Blumstein, Cooper, Zurif, & 
Caramazza, 1977; Blumstein, Myers, & Rissman, 2005), and the facility and time course 
of visual word recognition depends on orthographic neighborhood of the particular word 
(Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson, & Besner, 1977; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). 
Anytime we see a homograph or hear a homonym, we temporarily activate its multiple 
meanings (Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Kintsch, 1988). Likewise, in reading 
polysemous words such as “fan,” both a summer appliance and an arm-waving admirer 
may come to mind and compete for attention (Bedny, McGill, & Thompson-Schill, 2008; 
Klein & Murphy, 2001, 2002). In computational models of lexical ambiguity of 
polysemous words, distinct mental representations of word senses are viewed as stable 
states within a semantic space that is shaped by the general frequency of the word sense 
as well as the specific context in which the word is encountered (Gernsbacher & St John, 
2001; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2004). Context plays an important role in 
presenting and constraining interpretations of not only homonyms and polysemous 
words, but also those of language and discourse more generally.  
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 The power of context to produce competition and interference between distinct 
objects in a visual scene during sentence comprehension has been extensively examined 
using the Visual World Paradigm (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, 
& Sedivy, 1995). In most uses of this paradigm, eye movements are monitored as 
subjects view scenes while listening to a description of an event in which objects in the 
scene take part. Depending on the objects displayed in the scene, subjects predictively 
pursue incorrect interpretations of a sentence before it is finished, leading to interference 
between syntactic interpretations, and also between displayed objects (Novick, Trueswell, 
& Thompson-Schill, 2005). Interference between similar but discrete objects is also 
reflected in computer-mouse trajectories as subjects click and drag objects on a computer 
screen during sentence comprehension (Farmer, Cargill, Hindy, Dale, & Spivey, 2007). 
The possibility that multiple instances of the same object in different states 
compete and potentially interfere with one another during sentence comprehension has 
recently been investigated with location change. In a series of eye-tracking experiments, 
Altmann and Kamide (2009) had subjects view a scene depicting various objects as they 
listened to a story about the objects in the scene. The story described an event in which 
the critical object first moved from one location to another, and then that same object was 
referred to again (e.g., “the woman will move the glass onto the table … then, she will 
pour the wine into the glass”). When an object was described as being moved, subjects 
were slightly more likely, when the object was named again, to fixate its presumed 
destination (e.g., the table) than when the described event left the object unmoved. And 
when the visual scene was removed before the language unfolded (such that subjects first 
viewed the scene, and then heard the sentences while looking at a blank screen), 
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sentential context fully determined where the eyes were directed. Altmann and Kamide 
argued that this was because removing the visual depiction of the object eliminated the 
competition between that depiction and the mental event-based representation of the 
object. Is there a competitive cost to maintaining multiple representations of an object in 
the different states through which it has passed? If so, the demands to resolve competition 
between incompatible interpretations of a linguistic stimulus referring to that object will 
likely require similar conflict resolution mechanisms studied using other cognitive 
control tasks, and will likely recruit top-down cognitive control processes mediated by 
prefrontal cortex. 
 
Ambiguity as a Form of Conflict 
 The demand to resolve competition between incompatible interpretations of a 
linguistic stimulus requires us to select relevant information from clutter, and should 
therefore recruit specific top-down cognitive control processes that are mediated by the 
prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Fuster, 2008). Cognitive control is the ability to 
override impulses, ignore distractions, and intentionally guide thoughts and actions in the 
pursuit of internal goals (Miller, 2000). A fundamental aspect of cognitive control is the 
ability to select a weakly activated representation instead of a stronger representation. 
Within a distribution-based competition framework for semantic comprehension (e.g, 
Thompson-Schill & Botvinick, 2006), semantic ambiguity can be understood as a form of 
conflict. Resolution of semantic conflict may require similar cognitive control 
mechanisms as do other forms of conflict such as the competition between incompatible 
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task sets, motor responses, and color representations which is induced by the Stroop 
color-word interference task. 
 The Stroop interference task is a classic paradigm used to experimentally induce 
conflict (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). For each trial of the Stroop task, subjects are 
presented with a single color word for which the typeface may not necessarily match the 
definition of the word (e.g., the word “green” in red typeface). Subjects must indicate the 
typeface color of the word, and ignore the linguistic meaning of the word. Because word 
reading is generally fast and automatic, most subjects experience interference between 
alternative representations of the stimulus word. The Stroop task has been extensively 
studied at cognitive, neural, and computational levels, and has been shown to involve 
conflict at multiple levels of representation (MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; MacLeod, 
2005). Manipulations to increase or dampen various forms of conflict in the Stroop task 
demonstrate conflict that is specific to the selection of semantic alternatives (e.g., Carter, 
Mintun, & Cohen, 1995; van Veen & Carter, 2005), the selection of motor response (e.g., 
Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990; Zysset, Müller, Lohmann, & Von Cramon, 2001), 
and the selection of task set (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). For instance, to dampen 
conflict at the level of motor response in a button-press Stroop task, investigators may 
include “response-ineligible” trials, in which the color term mismatches the typeface 
color, but the color term is not one of the possible response options (e.g., Milham, 
Banich, & Barad, 2003). To increase conflict at the level of task representation, 
investigators may require subjects to switch between color naming and word reading 
(e.g., Bub, Masson, & Lalonde, 2006). Changes in behavioral performance due to each of 
these task manipulations are captured in computational models of the Stroop task (e.g., 
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Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Cohen & Huston, 1994). For instance, by 
beginning each trial with residual activation of the task-demand units from the previous 
trial, neural network models simulate the carryover effects when switching between 
word-reading and color-naming (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002).  
 Shifting attention from one stimulus dimension to another in the Stroop task may 
be analogous to the need to shift attention from one object instantiation to another 
comprehension of an object state-change. Using the functional localization method in 
fMRI, we may infer the presence of shared conflict-specific neural processes across tasks, 
based on co-localization of signal change during conflict trials of a Stroop task and state-
change trials of an event comprehension task (cf. Saxe, Brett, & Kanwisher, 2006; 
Fedorenko & Kanwisher, 2009; January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). 
However, because the Stroop task involves multiple forms of conflict, the Stroop task by 
itself is not specific enough to confidently localize the neural response to conflict at a 
particular processing level. Because we are specifically interested in conflict at the level 
of semantic representation, we leverage our prior knowledge about the functional 
anatomy in making inferences about cognitive processes (Henson, 2005; Poldrack, 2006). 
In particular, we constrain analysis to a relatively well studied area of prefrontal cortex, 
left posterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (pVLPFC). 
  
Left pVLPFC Responds Specifically to Semantic Conflict 
 Thompson-Schill and colleagues were among the first researchers to use fMRI to 
extend the field of cognitive control to the domain of semantic retrieval. Thompson-
Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, and Farah (1997) demonstrated that activity in the left 
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pVLPFC during semantic retrieval is modulated by the cognitive control demand of the 
task. When generating verbs related to presented nouns, classifying object pictures by 
their attributes, and comparing words along specific semantic dimensions, the semantic 
conflict and demand for cognitive control was greater for trials with multiple competing 
responses than for trials in which there was a single dominant response. Each task and 
contrast had a unique pattern of activation, but increased percent signal change for all 
three conflict manipulations overlapped specifically in left pVLPFC. In a follow-up 
study, patients with damage to left pVLPFC made increased errors in generating verbs for 
“high conflict” nouns with many associated verbs relative to “low conflict” nouns that 
had just one strongly associated verb (Thompson-Schill et al., 1998). Moreover, the 
magnitude of this impairment depended on the extent of damage specific to left pVLPFC. 
Since then, neuroimaging, patient lesion, and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
studies converge to demonstrate that left pVLPFC is activated during and is necessary for 
resolving competition amongst incompatible semantic representations (Thompson-Schill, 
Bedny, & Goldberg, 2005; Badre & Wagner, 2007) 
 In particular, numerous studies demonstrate an important role for left pVLPFC in 
selecting context-appropriate meanings of ambiguous words (Metzler, 2001; Bedny, 
McGill, & Thompson-Schill, 2008). For instance, through measuring subjects’ computer-
mouse movements during TMS, we demonstrated the necessity of left pVLPFC for 
contextual disambiguation involving alternative weakly associated targets (Hindy, 
Hamilton, Houghtling, Coslett, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). For each trial, subjects were 
displayed two target words. Many of these target words were homonymous or 
polysemous, such that interpretation depended on the semantic context in which the target 
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appeared. Upon presentation of a stimulus cue, subjects indicated which of the targets 
was most strongly associated with the cue word. When the target was a strong associate, 
its ambiguity did not matter, but when the target was a weak associate, contextual 
disambiguation was important. For instance, the target “cards” is associated with the cue 
“queen,” but only in the context of playing cards, not in the context of greeting cards and 
postcards. Upon TMS disruption of left pVLPFC following presentation of a stimulus 
cue, subjects' mouse-movement trajectories revealed greater deviation toward a distractor 
when the target and cue had an ambiguous semantic relationship, than when the 
associative relationship was unambiguous. This ambiguity effect was extinguished when 
subjects were simultaneously shown both target and cue stimuli, which allowed them to 
correctly interpret the context of the associative relationship. These results suggest that 
TMS disrupted the process of contextual disambiguation of the target word, and that left 
pVLPFC is necessary to resolve semantic competition among stimulus interpretations 
when the interpretive context of a stimulus is ambiguous, and the appropriate meaning is 
underdetermined. 
 Left pVLPFC is also necessary for resolving working memory interference in 
item recognition tasks such as the recent probes task (Monsell, 1978; Sternberg, 1966). In 
the recent probes task, subjects are presented with a “target set” of items (e.g., digits, 
letters, faces, shapes, color patches) followed by a brief delay period during which the 
subject sees a blank screen and must maintain the target items in working memory. 
Subsequently, a single “probe” item appears, and the subject must indicate whether the 
probe item was in the corresponding target set. Interference is induced specifically on 
“recent negative” trials, in which the probe was not in the target set of the current trial, 
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but was in the target set of the previous trial. For recent negative trials, the subject must 
ignore the memory of the previous trial to accurately indicate that the probe was not part 
of the current trial’s target set. Evidence from patient lesion deficits, neuroimaging, and 
TMS appears to converge on the role of the prefrontral cortex in controlling working-
memory interference of prior items for recent negative trials (Jonides, Smith, Marshuetz, 
Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; D’Esposito, Postle, Jonides, & Smith, 1999; Thompson-
Schill et al., 2002; Feredoes, Tononi, & Postle, 2006; Feredoes & Postle, 2010).  
 In addition to generating verbs with many semantic competitors, selecting 
context-appropriate meanings of ambiguous words, and resolving working memory 
interference in item recognition, left pVLPFC has been shown to be critical for overriding 
misinterpretations of syntactically ambiguous sentences in the Visual World Paradigm 
discussed above (Novick et al., 2005; January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009and 
for completing sentences that have multiple alternative responses (Robinson, Blair, & 
Cipolotti, 1998; Robinson, Shallice, & Cipolotti, 2005). The mountain of evidence 
suggesting that left pVLPFC resolves competition between semantic representations, 
makes this brain area a useful marker of semantic conflict in the current studies on the 
comprehension of object state-change. 
 
Current Studies 
  Chapter 2 describes two experiments that seek to test whether the same brain 
regions were activated selectively by sentences referring to an object undergoing state 
change. In the first experiment, the same object was described as being changed either 
substantially or minimally by one of two actions (e.g., "the squirrel will sniff/crack the 
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acorn"). In the second experiment, the same action was described as either substantially 
or minimally changing one of two objects (e.g., “the girl will stomp on the penny/egg”). 
In each of these experiments, we separately vary the degree to which an object is changed 
in state by the described action, as well as the imageability of that described action, and 
measure dissociable components of the neural network that supports event 
comprehension and object representation. Across the experimental manipulations of 
action and object, we observe a consistent pattern of results across functionally-defined 
brain regions suggesting that multiple incompatible representations of an object are in 
conflict with one another when representing object state-change. Most notably, the 
greater the difference between the initial state and the end state of an object, the stronger 
the response in areas of left pVLPFC that are most sensitive to conflict on the individual-
subject level.  
 Based on the conflict-specific response in left pVLPFC we infer the presence of 
multiple object-state representations in each of the experiments described in Chapter 2. 
Yet we suspect that the neural substrate of multiple competing object representations 
includes patterns of distributed activation throughout ventral temporal cortex. 
Neuroimaging studies of semantic retrieval suggest that knowledge about individual 
concepts is distributed across networks of overlapping semantic representations in visual 
and temporal cortices. Many of the same cortical regions that are activated when people 
see pictures are also activated when they read words. Because the experiments described 
in Chapter 2 did not permit careful examination of visual object representations, we took 
a different approach for the experiment described in Chapter 3.   
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 Chapter 3 describes an fMRI experiment for which we used the “information-
based” approach of multi-voxel similarity analysis (Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, 
Haxby, & Parsons, 2009; Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008) to measure the 
distributed neural representations of brain states induced by imagining an object before 
and after a described action. We find that the physical similarity of incompatible object 
states before and after a described action predicts not only the strength of the conflict 
response in left pVLPFC, but also the multi-voxel pattern similarity of the corresponding 
brain states in feature-selective areas of early visual cortex. Moreover, distributed neural 
similarity in early visual cortex predicts the strength of the prefrontal cortex conflict 
response even better than separately collected similarity ratings of the incompatible 
object states. Results suggest that alternative states of an object correspond to distinct 
visual cortex representations, and that conflict measured in left pVLPFC is mediated by 
the similarity of distributed representations in visual cortex. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF OBJECT STATE-CHANGES ON EVENT 
PROCESSING: DO OBJECTS COMPETE WITH THEMSELVES? 
 
 
 
 A microscopic psychology has arisen . . . carried on by experimental methods, 
 asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their 
 uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical means.  
 
– The Principles of Psychology (William James, 1890) 
 
 
Abstract 
When an object is described as changing state during an event, do the representations of 
those states compete? The distinct states they represent cannot co-exist at any one 
moment in time, yet each representation must be retrievable at the cost of suppressing the 
other possible object states. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging of human 
subjects to test whether such competition does occur, and whether this competition 
between object states recruits brain areas sensitive to other forms of conflict. In 
Experiment 1, the same object was changed either substantially or minimally by one of 
two actions. In Experiment 2, the same action either substantially or minimally changed 
one of two objects. On a subject-specific basis, we identified voxels most responsive to 
conflict in a Stroop color-word interference task. Voxels in left posterior ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex most responsive to Stroop conflict were also responsive to our object 
state-change manipulation, and were not responsive to the imageability of the described 
action. In contrast, voxels in left middle frontal gyrus responsive to Stroop conflict were 
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not responsive even to language, and voxels in left middle temporal gyrus that were 
responsive to language and imageability were not responsive to object state-change. 
Results suggest that, when representing object state-change, multiple incompatible 
representations of an object compete, and the greater the difference between the initial 
state and the end state of an object, the greater the conflict. 
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Introduction  
 Event comprehension requires the ability to keep track of multiple representations 
of an object as it is altered in state or location. Recent work on language-mediated eye-
movements suggests that the mental representation of a described object is dissociable 
from the perceived object in a concurrently presented visual scene, and suggests further 
that multiple representations of (all or parts of) the same object in different states may 
compete and interfere with one another during event processing (Altmann & Kamide, 
2009). 
 On reading “The squirrel will crack the acorn,” we must represent that the acorn 
existed in distinct states: cracked and intact. If an immediately succeeding sentence reads 
“And then, it will lick the acorn,” the cracked state must be retrieved; if, instead, that 
sentence reads “But first, it will lick the acorn,” the intact state must be retrieved. Now 
consider replacing “The squirrel will crack the acorn” with “The squirrel will sniff the 
acorn.” Regardless of the “but first” or “and then,” there is no conflict regarding the 
representation to be retrieved. We hypothesize that reading about the cracked acorn will 
recruit brain regions usually associated with conflict resolution, whereas reading about 
the sniffed acorn will not.  
 Here, we test the proposal that selecting from amongst distinct states of the same 
object will selectively recruit prefrontal cortex regions sensitive to semantic conflict, and 
that this increased activation will overlap on a subject-specific basis with conflict-
dependent activation in a standard interference task. Event comprehension trials for each 
experiment varied in the degree to which a described object was changed in state. In 
Experiment 1, the same object was changed either substantially or minimally by one of 
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two actions (“crack” or “sniff”). In Experiment 2, the same action (“stomp on”) either 
substantially or minimally changed one of two objects (an egg or a penny). Conflict-
dependent fMRI data collected during a Stroop color-word interference task was used to 
create subject-specific regions of interest (ROIs) in left posterior ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (pVLPFC), a brain area responsive to semantic conflict (Thompson-Schill, Bedny, 
& Goldberg, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 2005). We additionally examined activation in 
two other ROIs: 1) voxels in left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) that were responsive to 
Stroop conflict but unresponsive to sentence comprehension; 2) voxels in left middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG) responsive to sentence comprehension but unresponsive to Stroop 
conflict. 
 In each experiment, the rated degree to which an object changed in state during an 
event, but not the rated imageability of the described action, parametrically predicted the 
amplitude of the BOLD response in left pVLPFC voxels most responsive to Stroop 
conflict. In contrast, object state-change did not predict activation in either left MFG or 
left MTG; in left MTG we instead observed an effect of action imageability. Across 
complementary manipulations of action (Expt. 1) and object (Expt. 2), the consistent 
linear effect of object state-change on conflict-responsive areas of left pVLPFC indicates 
that multiple states of an object do compete during event processing when the object is 
changed from its original state. 
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Materials and Methods 
Subjects. Sixteen right-handed native English speakers (9 female), aged 18-28 years, 
participated in Experiment 1, and a separate sample of 16 right-handed native English 
speakers (8 female), aged 19-33 years, participated in Experiment 2. Two additional 
subjects from Experiment 2 were excluded from data analysis and replaced due to 
unusually poor performance on the event comprehension task; one subject correctly 
identified fewer than half the catch trials; the other subject had a false-alarm rate that was 
10 times the average of all Experiment 2 subjects. All fMRI subjects were paid $20 per 
hour and were recruited from within the University of Pennsylvania community. Subjects 
gave informed consent as approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional 
Review Board. Additionally, 522 University of Pennsylvania undergraduate students 
participated for course credit in an online task used for stimulus norming (273 subjects in 
Experiment 1; 249 subjects in Experiment 2). All subjects spoke English as a first 
language. 
 
Event stimuli. Event comprehension items for each experiment consisted of two sentences 
describing a person or an animal acting upon a single object. Across conditions in each 
experiment, the object acted upon was either minimally or substantially changed in the 
first-sentence event. In Experiment 1, we varied the first-sentence action to induce the 
state-change manipulation; the object acted upon was identical for both “substantial state-
change” and “minimal state-change” conditions (e.g., “The squirrel will crack/sniff the 
acorn”). In Experiment 2, we held the action constant across conditions, and varied the 
object to induce the state-change manipulation (e.g., “The girl will stomp on the 
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penny/egg”). By separately varying the described action and the described object across 
Experiments 1 and 2, we avoid changes in pVLPFC activation being due to changes in 
the verb alone (Expt. 1) or the object alone (Expt. 2; that is, we test whether object state-
change drives conflict-dependent pVLPFC activation independent of variations in either 
action or object. Table 2.1 shows example items from each experiment, along with the 
object state-change and action imageability ratings corresponding to those items.  
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Table 2.1. Example stimuli from Experiments 1 and 2. Object state-change and 
action imageability for each sentence of each item was rated on a 7-point scale. 
fMRI subjects read each item in only one condition. The object state-change and 
action imageability ratings in the rightmost columns are specific to the first sentence 
of each item shown. 
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 The first-sentence verb for each item in Experiment 1 was matched across 
conditions on lexical ambiguity, measured as the number of distinct meanings (t(238) = 
0.75, p = .45; Burke, 2009), and on frequency of use (Brysbaert & New, 2009). The 
object referred to in each item in Experiment 2 was similarly matched across conditions 
on both lexical ambiguity (t(198) = 0.30, p = .77), and frequency (t(198) =  -0.89, p 
= .37). The action described in the second sentence was identical across conditions in 
both experiments, and always minimally affected the object. In Experiment 1, the 
temporal phrase at the beginning of each second sentence was either “but first” or “and 
then.” We included this manipulation to test the additional hypothesis that the 
“crack…but first” cases would engender increased activity compared to the “crack…and 
then” cases because of the need to switch the focus from the newly changed state to the 
previous (unchanged) state. However, we observed the same pattern of neural activity for 
both the “and then” and “but first” conditions in Experiment 1. (Though not reliable after 
correcting for multiple comparisons, the largest cluster of increased activation for 
conditions that required temporal resequencing was in left posterior superior temporal 
sulcus, an area often linked to speech processing as well as to theory of mind; cf. Hein & 
Knight, 2008.) In Experiment 2, we therefore kept temporal context constant across items 
by always beginning the second sentence with “and then.” For both experiments, subjects 
were exposed to all stimuli and all conditions in a fully factorial repeated measures 
design, but never saw more than one version of each stimulus.  
   
Event ratings. Object state-change and action imageability ratings for the first and second 
sentence of each item in each experiment were collected through online surveys. Each 
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survey subject rated only one alternative sentence of each item. For object state-change 
ratings, subjects rated “the degree to which the depicted object will be at all different 
after the action occurs that it had been before the action occurred.” Subjects rated each 
item on a 7-point scale ranging from “just the same” to “completely changed.” For action 
imageability, subjects rated “how much a sentence brings to mind a clear mental image of 
a particular action.” Subjects rated each item on a 7-point scale ranging from “not 
imageable at all” to “extremely imageable.”  
 Object state-change and action imageability ratings for the first-sentence events 
included data from 85 subjects for Experiment 1, and 101 subjects for Experiment 2. The 
first-sentence event in the “minimal state-change” condition received an average object 
state-change rating of 1.97 (SD = 0.57) in Experiment 1, and 2.78 (SD = 0.79) in 
Experiment 2. The first-sentence event in the “substantial state-change” condition 
received an average object state-change rating of 4.64 (SD = 0.84) in Experiment 1, and 
4.96 (SD = 0.74) in Experiment 2. Object state-change ratings varied broadly within the 
“minimal state-change” and “substantial state-change” conditions (Figure 2.1; the overall 
difference in object state-change between conditions was reliable in each experiment (p’s 
< .001). The average first-sentence action imageability rating for the “minimal state-
change” condition was 4.89 (SD = 0.64) in Experiment 1, and 5.57 (SD = 0.42) in 
Experiment 2. For the “substantial state-change” condition, the average first-sentence 
action imageability rating was 5.46 (SD = 0.41) in Experiment 1, and 5.59 (SD = 0.47) in 
Experiment 2. The difference in action imageability between conditions was reliable in 
Experiment 1 (p < .001), but was not reliable for Experiment 2 (p = .18). For both 
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experiments, object state-change correlated with neither frequency nor lexical ambiguity 
(see above; p’s > .4). 
 Object state-change and action imageability ratings for the second-sentence events 
included data from 95 subjects for Experiment 1, and 98 subjects for Experiment 2. The 
second-sentence events of all items in both experiments were designed to involve 
minimal object state-change. To confirm that there were no differences between 
conditions, we used a separate online survey to collect object state-change and action 
imageability ratings for these events. In Experiment 1, the second sentence of each item 
was identical across conditions, and had an average object state-change rating of 1.90 
(SD = 0.47), and an average action imageability rating of 4.52 (SD = 0.69). For the 
second sentence in Experiment 2, which had a different object in the “minimal” and 
“substantial” state-change conditions, the average object state-change rating was 1.69 
(SD = 0.44) for “minimal state-change” items and 1.74 (SD = 0.49) for “substantial state-
change” items, while the average action imageability rating was 4.23 (SD = 0.83) for 
“minimal state-change” items, and 4.13 (SD = 0.84) for “substantial state-change” items. 
Experiment 2 items did not reliably differ across conditions in either the object state-
change or the action imageability of the second-sentence event (p’s > .3).  
 For each experiment, we additionally collected ratings for the likelihood that the 
second sentence of each item would follow the first sentence of that item (if that first 
sentence had been read, for example, in a magazine or newspaper). We used separate 
online surveys to collect data from 93 subjects for Experiment 1 (which included 4 
conditions), and 50 subjects for Experiment 2 (which included 2 conditions). The average 
likelihood rating across “minimal state-change” event sequences was 4.06 (SD = 0.78) in 
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Experiment 1, and 4.12 (SD = 0.90) in Experiment 2. The average likelihood rating for 
“substantial state-change” event sequences was 4.08 (SD = 0.78) in Experiment 1, and 
4.28 (SD = 0.95) in Experiment 2. There was no statistical difference between state-
change conditions of either experiment in the rated likelihood of the event sequences 
(p’s > .2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Object state-change ratings for the first sentence of each item in the 
event comprehension task for Experiments 1 and 2. (A) Experiment 1 items, 
including each item’s “minimal state-change” condition and “substantial state-
change” condition, ranked by object state-change. (B) Experiment 2 items ranked 
by object state-change. 
 
 
Event comprehension task. The event comprehension task in each fMRI experiment was 
separated into five runs, with an equal number of trials of each condition in each run. 
Experiment 1 included 120 experimental trials split across four conditions. Experiment 2 
included 100 experimental trials split across two conditions. Additionally, subjects in 
 
 
24 
 
each experiment read 15 “catch trials” in which the second-sentence event of the trial was 
implausible given the first-sentence event (e.g., “The mother will eat the sandwich. And 
then, she will serve the sandwich.”). The trial structure was identical in the two 
experiments. Each trial lasted six seconds, during which the first sentence was presented 
for three seconds, followed by the second sentence for three seconds. Subjects pressed 
the two outer buttons of a keypad when the second-sentence event was implausible given 
the first-sentence event. Trials were separated by 3 to 15 seconds of jittered fixation, 
optimized for statistical power using the OptSeq algorithm 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 
(Psychology Software Tools).  
 
Stroop color-word interference task. After the event comprehension task, subjects in each 
experiment performed a 10-minute button-press Stroop color identification task, based on 
previously described procedures (M. P. Milham et al., 2001; January et al., 2009). The 
response box for this task was restricted to three buttons: yellow, green, and blue. Stimuli 
included four trial types: response-eligible conflict, response-ineligible conflict, and two 
groups of neutral trials. Subjects were presented with a single word for each trial, and 
instructed to press the button corresponding to the typeface color of each word. Conflict 
trials could be either response-eligible or response-ineligible. For response-eligible 
conflict trials, the color term matched one of the subject’s possible responses (i.e., yellow, 
green, or blue), but always mismatched the typeface color. For response-ineligible 
conflict trials, the color term (orange, brown, or red) mismatched the typeface color, and 
but was not a possible response. Separate sets of non-color neutral trials (e.g., farmer, 
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stage, tax) were intermixed with either response-eligible conflict trials or response-
ineligible conflict trials. Both response-eligible and response-ineligible conflict trial types 
have previously been demonstrated to induce conflict at non-response levels, while 
response-eligible conflict trials additionally induce conflict at the level of motor response 
(M. P. Milham et al., 2001). To optimize power for identifying subject-specific conflict-
responsive subregions of left pVLPFC and left MFG, we considered only the main effect 
of conflict trials versus neutral trials. 
 
Imaging procedure. Structural and functional data were collected on a 3-T Siemens Trio 
system and an eight-channel array head coil. Structural data included axial T1-weighted 
localizer images with 160 slices and 1 mm isotropic voxels (TR = 1620 ms, TE = 3.87 
ms, TI = 950 ms). Functional data included echo-planar fMRI performed in 44 axial 
slices and 3 mm isotropic voxels (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms). Twelve seconds preceded 
data acquisition in each functional run to approach steady-state magnetization. 
 
Data analysis. Image preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using AFNI 
(Cox, 1996). Functional data were sinc interpolated to correct for slice timing, and 
aligned to the mean of all functional images using a six parameter iterated least squares 
procedure. The functional data were then registered with each subject’s high-resolution 
anatomical data set, and normalized to a standard template in Talairach space. Finally, 
functional data were smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, and scaled to 
percent signal change. Each two-sentence trial was modeled as a six-second boxcar 
function convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function, with an additional 
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covariate in the subject-wise parametric analysis to model the degree of object state-
change (or action imageability) of the item for each trial. Beta coefficients were estimated 
using a modified general linear model that included a restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation of the temporal auto-correlation structure, a polynomial baseline fit, and the 
motion parameters and global signal as covariates of no interest.  
 Our analyses are focused on three ROIs, one (pVLPFC) that is our primary region 
of interest and two (left MFG and left MTG) that serve as controls for our purposes. 
Stroop-conflict ROIs in both left pVLPFC and left MFG were functionally defined 
separately for each subject using data obtained during the Stroop color-word interference 
task. Additionally, each Stroop-conflict ROI was anatomically constrained based on 
probabilistic anatomical atlases (Eickhoff et al., 2005) transformed into Talairach space. 
Left pVLPFC was defined as the combination of pars triangularis (Brodmann area 45), 
pars opercularis (Brodmann area 44), and the anterior half of the inferior frontal sulcus. 
Across subjects from both experiments, the anatomical definition of left pVLPFC 
included an average of 784 voxels (SD = 35). Left MFG included portions of Brodmann 
areas 6, 9, 10, and 46. Across subjects from both experiments, the anatomical definition 
of left MFG included an average of 962 voxels (SD = 40). Across subjects from both 
experiments, the anatomical definition of left MTG included an average of 644 voxels 
(SD = 33). Within these broad anatomical boundaries, each Stroop-conflict ROI 
comprised the 50 voxels with the highest t-statistics in a within-subject contrast of 
conflict trials versus neutral trials in the Stroop color-word interference task, while the 
sentence-comprehension ROI comprised the 50 left MTG voxels with the highest t-
statistics in a within-subject contrast of all event comprehension trials (averaged across 
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conditions) versus baseline. Although analyses are reported for ROIs of 50 voxels, the 
same statistical patterns were consistently observed across a broad range of ROI sizes. All 
statistical tests for each ROI were evaluated at the two-tailed .05 level of significance. 
Finally, we assessed the object state-change effect in each voxel across the whole brain, 
corrected for multiple comparisons, which we report at the end of the Results. 
 
Results 
Stroop color-word interference task  
Across Experiments 1 and 2, subjects correctly answered 98% of all trials. The average 
response time was 706 ms for conflict trials and 656 ms for neutral trials (t(31) = 6.60, p 
< .001). In a group-level contrast that included all subjects from both experiments, the 
most reliable cluster of voxels with an activation difference between conflict trials and 
neutral trials was centered between the inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) and the 
inferior frontal sulcus of left pVLPFC (Figure 2A). Additional clusters of increased 
activation for conflict trials relative to neutral trials were observed in left MFG and left 
intraparietal sulcus. 
 
Stroop-conflict ROI in left pVLPFC 
To determine voxels most responsive to conflict on an individual subject level, we 
identified for each subject the 50 left pVLPFC voxels with the highest t-statistics in a 
contrast of conflict trials versus neutral trials in the Stroop interference task. The location 
of the top 50 conflict-responsive voxels varied widely across subjects, with slightly more 
cross-subject overlap in the most posterior area of left pVLPFC, at the junction of pars 
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triangularis, pars opercularis, and the inferior frontal sulcus (Figure 2B). Within each 
subject-specific Stroop-conflict ROI in left pVLPFC, we examined the effect of object 
state-change on the amplitude of the BOLD signal. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Stroop-conflict ROI in left pVLPFC. (A) Whole-brain group-level 
contrast of conflict trials versus neutral trials in the Stroop color-word interference 
task, thresholded at a corrected alpha of p < .01, and displayed on a partially 
inflated Talairach surface; left pVLPFC is outlined in white. (B) Probabilistic 
overlap map of the subject-specific Stroop-conflict ROIs in left pVLPFC. Each 
subject-specific ROI included the 50 left pVLPFC with the highest within-subject t-
statistics for the Stroop contrast. The left pVLPFC voxel with the greatest overlap 
across subjects included 7 of the 32 total subjects from both Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. 
 
 
Experiment 1 event comprehension (object fixed, action varied) 
Subjects correctly identified 97% of catch trials in the Experiment 1 event comprehension 
task, and committed false alarms (i.e., classifying a non-catch trial as implausible) on 
fewer than 2% of experimental trials. There was a slightly but reliably greater number of 
false alarms for the substantial state-change trials (2%) than for the minimal state-change 
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trials (1%; t(15) = 2.46, p = .03). Due to the small numbers involved, this difference was 
also tested in a chi-square test, and was also found to be significant (χ-square = 9.62, p 
= .002). False alarm trials, along with catch trials, were coded separately for all fMRI 
analyses. 
 The average signal change across all sentence conditions was reliably above 
baseline in the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI (t(15) = 8.59, p < .001), indicating that 
this ROI was generally responsive during sentence comprehension. Because action 
imageability ratings were correlated with object state-change (r = .50), we removed 
variance predicted by the action imageability ratings before comparing the “substantial 
state-change” and “minimal state-change” conditions, though including action 
imageability as a covariate did not influence the reliability of any effects. A significant 
main effect of object state-change emerged within the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI 
(t(15) = 2.50, p = .02; Figure 2.3A), but there was no effect of temporal order (“and then” 
versus “but first”) and no interaction (p’s > .4). Next, we used the data from ratings of 
object state-change and action imageability to examine the relationship between these 
stimulus dimensions and signal change within the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI. 
Analyses separately tested the reliability of object state-change and action imageability 
effects across subjects and across items. Because we did not find an effect of the temporal 
context of the second sentence (either “but first” or “and then”), we averaged across these 
temporal conditions in each Experiment 1 parametric analysis that used the object state-
change or action imageability ratings. 
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Figure 2.3. Experiment 1 left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI analysis. (A) Percent 
signal change plots from a categorical analysis of the “minimal state-change” and 
“substantial state-change” conditions. (B) Beta coefficients across a broad range of 
ROI sizes from a subject-wise parametric analysis of voxel activation predicted by 
object state-change and action imageability stimulus ratings. A vertical line indicates 
the 50-voxel threshold for each subject’s left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI. Error 
bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. (C) Binned quartile visualization of 
the subject-wise parametric analysis. (D) Item analysis of stimulus ratings and voxel 
activation. Item-specific activation, averaged across subjects, in the left pVLPFC 
Stroop-conflict ROI is plotted against the object state-change and action 
imageability stimulus ratings.  
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 In a subject-wise parametric analysis, we measured the extent to which, for each 
subject, the BOLD signal amplitude within the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI varied 
in proportion to either object state-change or action imageability. Data were separately 
modeled for each subject, using one covariate to model each trial presentation, and a 
second covariate to model the degree of object state-change (or action imageability) of 
the item for each trial. Estimation of these beta coefficients converged with results from 
the categorical analyses above, as object state-change stimulus ratings reliably predicted 
left pVLPFC signal amplitude (t(15) = 3.44, p = .004). In contrast, action imageability 
ratings did not reliably predict left pVLPFC signal amplitude (t(15) = -0.27, p = .79). 
Moreover, across a broad range of ROI sizes, object state-change reliably predicted signal 
amplitude within the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI, while action imageability did not 
reliably predict activation (Figure 2.3B). Interestingly, while object state-change 
consistently predicted left pVLPFC signal amplitude, both across subjects and across ROI 
sizes, there was much greater variance across subjects in the degree to which the action 
imageability ratings predicted signal. This may reflect individual experiential differences 
across subjects. To further visualize this dissociation, we binned the items into quartiles 
according to either the object state-change or the action imageability ratings of the stimuli 
(Figure 2.3C).  
 In an item-wise analysis, we measured the extent to which, for each item averaged 
across subjects, BOLD signal amplitude within the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI 
could be predicted by the stimulus ratings. Data were separately modeled for each trial, 
and then individual beta coefficients were binned by item across subjects. Because each 
of the 120 items included 2 state-change versions (i.e., "substantial state-change" and 
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"minimal state-change"), and because each subject read only one version of each item, 
there were 238 degrees of freedom in the Experiment 1 item analysis, and the average 
percent signal change of each item was composed of data from 8 of the 16 subjects. 
Object state-change ratings correlated with percent signal change in the left pVLPFC 
Stroop-conflict ROI (r(238) = .15, p = .02), while action imageability ratings did not 
predict signal (r(238) = .01, p = .82; Figure 2.3D).  
 
Experiment 2 event comprehension (object varied, action fixed) 
Subjects correctly identified 92% of catch trials in the Experiment 2 event comprehension 
task, and committed false alarms on 2% of experimental trials, with an equal number of 
false alarms for the substantial state-change and minimal state-change conditions (t(15) = 
1.21, p = .25; χ-square = 1.87, p = .17). As in Experiment 1, false alarm trials were coded 
separately, along with catch trials, for all fMRI analyses. 
 All Experiment 1 effects of object state-change on activation in the left pVLPFC 
Stroop-conflict ROI replicated in Experiment 2. As in Experiment 1, the average percent 
signal change across conditions was reliably different from baseline (t(15) = 6.65, p 
< .001). With action imageability covaried out, there was a reliable categorical effect of 
the “substantial state-change” condition versus the “minimal state-change” condition 
(t(15) = 3.03, p = .008; Figure 2.4A). In the subject-wise parametric analysis, object 
state-change reliably predicted ROI activation (t(15) = 2.98, p = .009), while action 
imageability did not (t(15) = -0.37, p = .71). As in Experiment 1, this pattern was reliable 
across a broad range of ROI sizes, with greater variance across subjects in the action 
imageability parameter estimate than in the object state-change parameter estimate 
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(Figure 2.4B). In the item-wise analysis, object state-change ratings reliably predicted 
percent signal change in the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI (r(198) = .24, p < .001), 
while action imageablity did not predict signal change (r(198) = .00, p = .98; Figure 
2.4D). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Experiment 2 left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI analysis. (A) Categorical 
analysis. (B) Subject-wise parametric analysis beta coefficients across a broad range 
of ROI sizes. (C) Binned quartile visualizations of the subject-wise parametric 
analysis. (D) Item analysis of stimulus ratings and voxel activation. 
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 Though the same verb was used across conditions in the first sentence of each 
Experiment 2 item, individual verbs may have multiple action connotations. To control 
for the potential variability of action connotation, a large subset of the Experiment 2 
stimuli (60 of the 100 total items) were matched as nearly as possible on the specific 
action connotation of the first-sentence verb. In the item-level analysis, the pattern of 
results in the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI for this subset of the stimuli was identical 
to that of the full Experiment 2 stimulus set of 100 items for object state-change (r(58) 
= .27, p < .001), and for action imageability (r(58) = .00, p =. 99).  
 
Comparisons across ROIs  
As is evident in Figure 2A, the group-level analysis of the Stroop color-word interference 
task revealed a separate cluster of conflict-responsive voxels outside of left pVLPFC, in 
left MFG. Likewise, brain areas other than left pVLPFC, including left MTG, were 
generally active during sentence reading. We analyzed data from the left MTG region in 
particular, because of its putative involvement in semantic memory (cf. Martin, 2007)). 
To examine task-related effects in conflict-responsive MFG regions and language-
responsive MTG regions, we identified for each subject the 50 left MFG voxels with the 
highest t-statistics in a contrast of conflict trials versus neutral trials in the Stroop task, 
and the 50 left MTG voxels with the highest t-statistics in a contrast of all event 
comprehension trials (averaged across conditions) versus baseline (Figure 5A). As was 
the case in left pVLPFC, the location of the top 50 conflict-responsive voxels in left 
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MFG, and the top 50 language-responsive voxels in left MTG, varied widely across 
subjects (Figure 5A).  
  
 
Figure 2.5. Left MFG and left MTG ROI analysis for Experiments 1 and 2. (A) 
Probabilistic overlap maps of the subject-specific Stroop-conflict ROI in left MFG 
and the subject-specific sentence-comprehension ROI in left MTG. (B) Subject-wise 
parametric analysis beta coefficients across a broad range of Stroop-conflict ROI 
sizes for each experiment in left MFG. (C) Subject-wise beta coefficients across a 
broad range of sentence-comprehension ROI sizes for each experiment in left MTG. 
 
 
 Unlike the pVLPFC region described earlier, these two control regions each 
responded to only one of our two functional localizers: The Stroop-conflict ROI in left 
MFG was not on average responsive during sentence reading, while the sentence-
comprehension ROI in left MTG was not responsive to Stroop conflict. The average left 
MFG signal change across all sentential conditions was not reliably different from 
baseline in either Experiment 1 (t(15) = -0.02, p = .98) or Experiment 2 (t(15) = -1.10, p 
= .29). Likewise, left MTG signal change was not reliably different between Stroop 
conflict trials and neutral trials in either Experiment 1 (t(15) = 0.55, p = .59) or 
Experiment 2 (t(15) = -1.29, p = .22). Within these subject-specific ROIs, we repeated for 
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each experiment the subject-wise and item-wise analyses described above for object 
state-change and action imageability.  
 For each experiment, we used an ANOVA to test for the interaction between 
region (pVLPFC, MFG, and MTG) and the degree to which the object state-change 
ratings predicted BOLD response amplitude. Object state-change beta coefficients 
differed significantly across ROIs for both Experiment 1 (F(2,30) = 3.98, p = .03) and 
Experiment 2 (F(2,30) = 3.74, p = .04). Planned comparisons further revealed that object 
state-change did not reliably predict signal amplitude in either the left MFG Stroop-
conflict ROI (Figure 5B) or the left MTG sentence-comprehension ROI (Figure 5C). For 
Experiment 1, beta coefficients for object state-change were reliably different between 
left MTG and left pVLPFC ROIs (t(15) = 3.43, p = .004), while the difference between 
left MFG and left pVLPFC beta coefficients did not reach significance (t(15) = 1.17, p 
= .26). For Experiment 2, object state-change beta coefficients in both left MTG (t(15) = 
2.36, p = .03) and left MFG (t(15) = 2.44, p = .03) were reliably different from pVLPFC. 
Object state-change beta coefficients were not reliably different between left MTG and 
left MFG in either experiment (p’s > .1). 
 We conducted a similar set of analyses in order to examine interactions between 
region and imageability. The action imageability beta coefficients did not reliably differ 
across ROIs for either Experiment 1 (F(2,30) = 1.97, p = .16) or Experiment 2 (F(2,30) = 
1.31, p = .28). Experiment 1 planned comparisons, however, revealed a negative 
correlation between action imageability ratings and left MTG response amplitude (t(15) = 
-2.2, p = .04), while the difference between action imageability beta coefficients in left 
MTG and left pVLPFC was marginally reliable (t(15) = 1.77, p = .10). In Experiment 2, 
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in which the variance of the action imageability ratings was more constrained (σ2 = 0.37 
for Experiment 1; σ2 = 0.18 for Experiment 2), MTG beta coefficients for action 
imageability did not reliably differ either from baseline or from any other ROI (p’s > .1). 
 
Whole-brain conjunction analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 
To compare the influence of object state-change on neural activity across the two 
experiments, we first co-varied out activation predicted by the action imageability ratings 
for each experiment, and then measured the extent to which activation of each voxel was 
predicted by the object state-change ratings (correcting for multiple comparisons). Both 
experiments showed extensive change-related activity in left pVLPFC (Figure 6A; Table 
2.2). Additionally, there was an interaction between Experiment and the object state-
change effect in the right inferior parietal lobule, an area specifically implicated in studies 
of gesture recognition and body schema, in which action understanding is independent of 
objects (Hermsdörfer et al., 2001; Chaminade, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005). Right 
supramarginal gyrus was significantly more responsive to object state-change in 
Experiment 1, in which the described action varied across “substantial state-change” and 
“minimal state-change” conditions, than in Experiment 2, in which the described action 
was identical across conditions (Figure 6B).  
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Figure 2.6. Whole-brain conjunction analysis of Experiments 1 and 2. (A) Overlap 
of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 voxels reliably predicted by the object state-
change ratings, after removing variance predicted by the action imageability 
ratings. (B) Between-experiment differences in object state-change responsive 
voxels. Each contrast is thresholded at p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons. 
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Table 2.2. Whole-brain analysis for Experiments 1 and 2. Clusters of voxels reliably 
predicted by the object state-change ratings, after removing variance predicted by 
the action imageability ratings. Each contrast is thresholded at of p < .05, corrected 
for multiple comparisons. There were no statistically reliable voxel clusters with 
Experiment 2 > Experiment 1. Talairach coordinates and anatomical labels indicate 
the location of the peak voxel of each cluster. DMPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex. 
 
 
Discussion 
 Tracking objects across events requires maintaining multiple representations of 
the same object in different states. We demonstrate that this component of event cognition 
elicits a neural response in left pVLPFC that overlaps with increased activation for 
conflict trials in a Stroop color-word interference task. Through analysis of rated stimulus 
norms, we further observe that the degree to which an object is changed during an event 
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parametrically predicts the BOLD response amplitude in left pVLPFC voxels most 
sensitive to Stroop conflict; the rated imageability of the action does not. In Experiment 
1, the described object was identical for the “substantial state-change” and “minimal 
state-change” conditions; the state-change manipulation was thus driven by the described 
action. In Experiment 2, the described action was identical across conditions; this state-
change manipulation was driven instead by the affordances of the described object. 
 Convergence across experiments demonstrates the generalizability of the effects 
of object state-change on semantic conflict. By varying the number of voxels included in 
the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI, we demonstrate that this effect is robust within 
subjects across a wide range of ROI sizes. Moreover, the reliable item-wise correlations 
between object state-change ratings and BOLD response amplitude in the left pVLPFC 
Stroop-conflict ROI suggest that the effects generalize across a diverse stimulus 
population of actions, objects, and events, and highlights the utility of item analysis of 
fMRI data (Bedny et al., 2007).  
 In each experiment we observe a dissociation among three sets of voxels: 1) 
voxels in left pVLPFC that are sensitive to Stroop conflict and are activated above 
baseline during sentence comprehension, 2) voxels in left MFG that are sensitive to 
Stroop conflict but are not activated above baseline during sentence comprehension, and 
3) voxels in left MTG that are not sensitive to Stroop conflict but are activated above 
baseline during sentence comprehension. In each experiment, object state-change ratings 
parametrically predicted BOLD amplitude in the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI, while 
action imageability ratings did not. This functional dissociation within the left pVLPFC 
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Stroop-conflict ROI is in stark contrast to patterns of results in both left MFG and left 
MTG. 
  In the left MFG Stroop-conflict ROI, which was responsive to Stroop conflict but 
not to sentence reading, neither object state-change nor action imageability reliably 
predicted BOLD amplitude. While left MFG has been shown to be responsive to Stroop 
conflict beyond the level of motor response (Milham et al., 2001), it is generally not 
associated with semantic conflict (Binder et al., 2009), and dissociates from left pVLPFC 
with respect to item-specific memory interference, as evidenced by neuroimaging 
(D’Esposito et al., 1999), patient lesion (Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), and transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (Feredoes & Postle, 2010) studies. Instead, posterior-most areas of 
left MFG, where we observe the greatest cross-subject overlap of this ROI, may be 
specifically involved in maintaining task representations (Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & 
Von Cramon, 2005).  
 In the left MTG sentence-comprehension ROI, which was not responsive to 
Stroop conflict but was responsive during sentence reading, object state-change did not 
predict BOLD amplitude in either experiment. However, in Experiment 1, the rated 
imageability of the described action negatively correlated with MTG signal. Because 
event comprehension places a stronger demand on semantic retrieval processes when it is 
more difficult to bring to mind a clear mental image of the described action, the negative 
correlation of action imageability ratings with left MTG activation is concordant with 
studies of left MTG responsiveness to difficulty manipulations in semantic retrieval tasks 
(e.g., Whitney, Kirk, O’Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2011). The absence of an 
action imageability effect in Experiment 2 is predicted by reduced variance of the action 
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imageability ratings (the described action was fixed across state-change conditions). The 
modulation of left pVLPFC and left MTG response by object state-change and action 
imageability respectively, replicates previous dissociations between these regions (e.g., 
Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, & Kan, 1999; M. Bedny et al., 2008), indicating 
functionally distinct contributions of these regions to event comprehension. 
 In contrast to left MTG and left MFG, left pVLPFC is consistently shown to be 
central in resolving competition amongst incompatible semantic representations 
(Thompson-Schill, Bedny, & Goldberg, 2005). Neuroimaging, patient lesion, and 
transcranial magnetic stimulation studies demonstrate that left pVLPFC is activated 
during and is necessary for overriding misinterpretations of syntactically ambiguous 
sentences (January et al., 2009), selecting context-appropriate meanings of ambiguous 
words (Metzler, 2001; Hindy, Hamilton, Houghtling, Coslett, & Thompson-Schill, 2009), 
completing sentences that have multiple alternative responses (Robinson et al., 1998; 
Robinson et al., 2005), generating verbs with many semantic competitors (Thompson-
Schill et al., 1997), and resolving working memory interference in item recognition 
(Feredoes et al., 2006; Feredoes & Postle, 2010). 
 Stepping back from the ROIs, and examining activation across the entire brain, 
we see that voxels sensitive to the object state-change manipulation overlapped across 
experiments in left pVLPFC. In contrast, areas of the inferior parietal lobe that were 
sensitive to the state-change manipulation in Experiment 1 were not sensitive to this 
manipulation in Experiment 2. Because the described action varied across conditions in 
Experiment 1, but was fixed across conditions in Experiment 2, this dissociation is 
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consistent with literature that associates these inferior parietal lobe areas with action 
representation independent of the objects acted upon (Glover, 2004). 
 Stepping back further, and considering the theoretical implications of these data, 
correlations between rated degree of object state-change and BOLD response in the left 
pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI may at first seem consistent with an account that the more 
an object is changed in state during the first sentence of a trial, the more information must 
be inferred to derive the context-appropriate representation of the same object in the 
second sentence. This would predict, however, an interaction with temporal context in 
Experiment 1, because in the ‘and then’ case, the state computed at the end of the first 
sentence is identical to that referred to at the end of the second (but would be different in 
the ‘but first’ case). There was no such interaction. Additionally, Experiment 2 subjects 
only ever read “and then” versions of the stimuli, encouraging maintenance of only the 
changed instantiation, yet we still observed evidence of conflict. Alternatively, one might 
suppose that the more an object is changed in state, the more information must be kept in 
memory. This would not predict any interaction with temporal context. However, the left 
pVLPFC has elsewhere been shown to be associated with resolving interference in 
working memory independently of working memory itself (Thompson-Schill et al., 
2002). Thus, the location in which we observe sensitivity to object state-change, as well 
as the functional specificity of the ROI to Stroop conflict, suggests that our data do not 
reflect memory load. 
 We conjecture instead that multiple instantiations of the same object (whether of 
the object representation in its entirety, or of components of the object representation) 
must be represented when the object is described as changing in state, and that there is 
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interference between these instantiations. This could include interference between the 
sensorimotor instantiations of the different affordances associated with distinct object 
states, mediated by the event representations within which multiple object instantiations 
are distinguished (cf. Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Because objects were generally 
changed from a canonical state to a marked state, the strength of the initially activated 
object representation may modulate the extent to which this initial representation remains 
active even after the contextually appropriate object representation has been computed. 
And while language and memory research (Bower, 2000; Van Dyke & McElree, 2006) 
has shown evidence of similarity-based interference between actively maintained object 
representations, we find that the more dissimilar the ‘before’ and ‘after’ instantiations of 
an object, the greater the interference. This difference between distinct objects 
(similarity-based interference) and distinct instantiations of a single object (dissimilarity-
based interference) may have its roots in the fact that the distinct instantiations of an 
object across event-time (i.e., the ‘before’ and ‘after’) are mutually exclusive—they 
cannot co-exist. Distinct objects, on the other hand, can co-exist no matter how similar; 
the greater the overlap between the objects’ representations, the greater the interference, 
but differences between the objects do not have consequences for co-existence and are 
not inhibitory. When we need to categorize distinct representations as instantiations of a 
single object, left pVLPFC may act as a top-down modulatory signal to bias candidate 
representations—and the neural patterns that instantiate them—toward the context-
appropriate representation of the object, performing a similar interference resolution 
process as described for other forms of ambiguity resolution (Thompson-Schill & 
Botvinick, 2006).  
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 Our ability to comprehend, represent, recall, and narrate events is a 
quintessentially human ability. Yet the representation of multiple instantiations of the 
same object across “event time” (i.e., before, during, and after the event occurs), and how 
these may compete with one another, is a topic that has not received attention in cognitive 
psychology. Taken together, data reported here suggest that the need to represent the same 
object in different states comes at a competitive cost. The work reported here is a step 
toward identifying these representational mechanisms, and speaks to future cognitive 
models of object and event representation, allowing more detailed exploration of the 
representations over which the human cognitive system operates. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISTRIBUTED NEURAL SIMILARITY OF OBJECT STATES 
PREDICTS PREFRONTAL CONFLICT RESPONSE 
 
  The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought . . . whose 
 neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of dawning and dying processes too faint 
 and complex to be traced. 
 – The Principles of Psychology (William James, 1890) 
 
Abstract 
Prefrontal cortex is thought to exert executive control over posterior brain regions that 
store and maintain information. Previous work demonstrates that comprehension of an 
object state-change involves interference between incompatible representations of the 
same object, and evokes a neural response in prefrontal cortex that is the same as for 
other forms of conflict. Using fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis, we find that the 
physical similarity of incompatible object states before and after a described event 
predicts both the strength of the conflict response in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, as 
well as the multivariate pattern-similarity of the corresponding brain states in early 
ventral visual cortex. Moreover, visual cortex multivariate pattern-similarity predicts the 
strength of the prefrontal cortex conflict response even better than the rated similarity of 
the object states. Results suggest that alternative states of an object correspond to distinct 
visual cortex representations, and that conflict measured in prefrontal cortex is mediated 
by the similarity of distributed representations in visual cortex. 
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Introduction 
 Tracking multiple representations of the same object as it undergoes a state-
change engenders conflict due to the need to distinguish the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states of 
the object. This source of conflict is suggested by recent eye-tracking and neuroimaging 
studies, which also reveal that this conflict evokes a neural response in left posterior 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (pVLPFC) that is the same as for other known forms of 
conflict (Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, & Thompson-Schill, 
2012). This left pVLPFC conflict response suggests that the internal representations of 
alternative object states may be incompatible and distinct from one another. We 
hypothesize that the degree to which internal representations of object states are in fact 
distinct will be reflected in the similarity between distributed patterns of neural activation 
that underlie object-specific brain states. 
 Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a combination of 
multivariate and univariate data analysis, we test (1) whether comprehension of an object 
state-change causes a distinct distributed pattern of the BOLD response in ventral visual 
cortex (VVC) as well as left pVLPFC, (2) whether comprehension of an object state-
change causes a univariate amplitude-modulation of the average BOLD response in VVC 
and in left pVLPFC, and (3) whether there is a predictive relationship between 
multivariate pattern-similarity in VVC and univariate amplitude-modulation in left 
pVLPFC. Through an initial multivariate pattern-similarity searchlight analysis 
(Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006), we identified subregions of VVC for which 
object state-change best predicted multivariate pattern-similarity, and measured the extent 
to which these VVC subregions overlapped with areas of VVC that were most responsive 
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to either feature-scrambled objects or intact objects (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Grill-
Spector & Malach, 2004). For a subsequent ROI analysis, we identified separately for 
each subject the feature-sensitive (early visual) and object-sensitive (late visual) visual 
areas, and areas of left pVLPFC most responsive to conflict trials in a Stroop color-word 
interference task (Milham et al., 2001; Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2006). Within 
each ROI, we measured multivariate pattern-similarity (Pearson correlation) and 
univariate amplitude-modulation (difference in the average BOLD response amplitude) 
across within-trial time points of an fMRI variant of a traditional pretest-posttest 
experimental design. 
 Direct comparison of object-specific brain states before and after a described 
action was afforded by a pre-action/post-action fMRI design. Each experiment trial began 
with a briefly presented object photograph, followed by a sequence of three visual 
imagery task instructions separated by fixation: imagine the object, then imagine a 
specified action involving the object, and finally imagine the object in its final state after 
the action. Across trials, we varied whether a described action minimally changed the 
depicted object (e.g., "pick up the balloon"; Figure 3.1A), or substantially changed the 
object (e.g., "inflate the balloon"; Figure 3.1B). To compare subjects’ brain states before 
and after the object state-change, we separately modeled the BOLD response for each 
trial component before comparing the multivariate pattern-similarity and the univariate 
amplitude-modulation across the pre-action and post-action time points (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.1. Pre-action/post-action fMRI design. Each experiment trial began with a 
briefly presented object photograph, followed by a sequence of three visual imagery 
task instructions separated by fixation: imagine the object, then imagine a specified 
action involving the object, and finally imagine the object in its final state after the 
action. Subsequent to the three visual imagery segments, a retrieval cue instructed 
subjects to indicate which of two clipart images is most similar to the object at either 
the beginning or end of the trial. One of the clipart images depicted the object in its 
original state, while the other clipart image depicted the object in the altered state 
that resulted in the substantial state-change condition. Each slide was four seconds 
in duration, with six seconds of fixation between slides. The BOLD response was 
separately modeled for each trial component. 
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Figure 3.2. Pattern-similarity and amplitude-modulation measurements. To examine 
the effects of object state-change on across-time multivariate pattern-similarity and 
univariate amplitude-modulation, we separately modeled the BOLD response for 
each trial component, and compared the time point in which subject imagined the 
initial state of the object (pre-action state) to the time point in which subjects 
imagined the end state of the object (post-action state). Plot on the far right shows 
the object state-change rating for each item in the state-change comprehension task, 
ranked by object state-change, and color-coded according to condition (i.e., 
“minimal state-change” or “substantial state-change”).  
 
 
 
Results 
Behavioral Data 
Subjects correctly identified the indicated object on the subsequent-retrieval slide for 
87.0% (SD = 8.1%) of minimal state-change trials, and 94.6% (SD = 5.7%) of substantial 
state-change trials (t(13) = 2.68, p = .02). Overall high accuracy on the subsequent-
retrieval task indicates consistent attention to the task throughout the scan. Slightly lower 
accuracy for the minimal state-change trials than for the substantial state-change trials is 
not surprising given that subjects were never exposed to the alternative object state for 
minimal state-change trials, thus making the clipart images less distinguishable from one 
another. On the Stroop color-word interference task, subjects correctly answered 98.3% 
(SD = 2.4%) of all trials. The average response time was 790 ms (SD = 165 ms) for 
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conflict trials and 755 ms (SD = 184 ms) for neutral trials (t(13) = 2.64, p = .02). For the 
perceptual localizer, in which subjects performed a one-back repeated-image detection 
task, subjects correctly identified 79.3% (SD = 24.6%) of repeated intact objects, and 
72.1% (SD = 26.9%) of repeated feature-scrambled objects (t(13) = 2.54, p = .02). Lower 
detection accuracy for feature-scrambled repeats than for intact-object repeats may 
indicate a difference between conditions regarding the perceptual difficulty of the 
detection task. 
 
Multivariate Pattern-Similarity Searchlight Analysis 
We used a multivariate searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006) 
to examine the effect of object state-change on the visual cortex multivariate pattern-
similarity between time points before and after the imagined action. We constrained 
searchlight analyses to bilateral VVC, which included inferior occipital cortex, lingual 
gyrus, and the posterior aspects of fusiform gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus. We passed 
a three-dimensional searchlight with a 3-voxel radius over every voxel within this VVC 
mask. Unless constrained by a boundary on the outermost edge of the VVC mask, each 
spherical searchlight comprised 123 voxels. Within each searchlight, we made three 
separate comparisons for each subject, and assigned the resulting measurements to the 
central voxel of the searchlight. The first comparison was univariate, and based on a 
perceptual localizer in which subjects viewed alternating 16-second blocks of intact and 
feature-scrambled objects. In this perceptual localizer, we measured the relative 
amplitude of the BOLD response at time points when subjects were viewing either intact 
or feature-scrambled objects. The second two comparisons were multivariate and based 
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on data from the state-change comprehension task. For each of the multivariate analyses, 
we measured the Pearson correlation between time points in which subjects imagined 
each object in its initial form, and then imagined the same object in its new form after a 
minimal or substantial state-change action. Once these pre-action/post-action similarity 
scores were computed, we measured the extent to which this similarity score could be 
predicted by either state-change rating (continuous searchlight analysis) or state-change 
condition (categorical searchlight analysis). 
 
Continuous Multivariate Searchlight Analysis 
For the continuous multivariate searchlight analysis, we used the data from ratings of 
object state-change to examine the extent to which pre-action/post-action multivariate 
pattern-similarity varied in proportion to the rated degree of object state-change. The 250 
searchlight spheres for which pre-action/post-action multivariate pattern-similarity most 
negatively correlated with the rated object state-change of the items are plotted in yellow 
in Figure 3.3A. As is evident in Figure 3.3A, the 250 searchlights for which the object 
state-change ratings best predicted multivariate pattern-similarity were almost exclusively 
in lingual and inferior occipital gyri. Moreover, these ratings-predicted searchlights 
overlapped extensively (105 of the 250 searchlights) with the feature localizer (colored in 
blue in Figure 3.3), and did not overlap at all with the object localizer (colored in red). 
 
Categorical Multivariate Searchlight Analysis 
For the categorical searchlight analysis, we split each subject’s dataset into minimal state-
change and substantial state-change conditions, and computed the average pre-
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action/post-action similarity across all items in each condition. This resulted in two 
statistical maps of VVC for each subject: one statistical map that reflected the average 
pre-action/post-action multi-voxel similarity for the minimal state-change condition, and 
one statistical map that reflected the average pre-action/post-action multi-voxel similarity 
for the substantial state-change condition. These statistical maps were compared across 
all subjects using repeated-measures t-tests that measured the reliability of pre-
action/post-action similarity differences between substantial state-change and minimal 
state-change conditions for each VVC searchlight. As in the continuous multivariate 
searchlight analysis, searchlight spheres that were most sensitive to object state-change 
when treated as a categorical variable tended to be in lingual and inferior occipital gyri, 
and overlapped exclusively with the feature localizer (130 of the 250 searchlights; Figure 
3.3B). 
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Figure 3.3. Multivariate pattern-similarity searchlight analysis. (A) Overlap of the 
visual cortex functional localizers and the 250 most reliable VVC searchlights in 
which similarity across time points negatively correlated with the degree of object 
state-change (continuous multivariate searchlight analysis). (B) Overlap of the 
visual cortex functional localizers and the 250 most reliable VVC searchlights in 
which patterns for the substantial state-change condition were less similar across 
time points than were patterns for the minimal state-change condition (categorical 
multivariate searchlight analysis). In both A and B, early visual is in blue, and 
includes the 250 VVC voxels that were most responsive to feature-scrambled objects 
in a perceptual localizer. Late visual is in red, and includes the 250 VVC voxels that 
were most responsive to intact objects in the perceptual localizer. Brain regions that 
are shaded in white in the images above were not included in the VVC anatomical 
mask. 
 
 
 
ROI Analysis 
We examined the effect of object state-change on both the multivariate pattern-similarity 
and the univariate amplitude-modulation of the BOLD response in three ROIs: early 
visual cortex, late visual cortex, and left pVLPFC. Each ROI was anatomically 
constrained and functionally defined on the individual-subject level. Within each subject-
specific visual cortex and pVLPFC ROI, we examined the effect of object state-change 
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on the across-time multivariate pattern-similarity and univariate amplitude-modulation 
during the object comprehension task. For each ROI analysis, we used an ANOVA to test 
for the interaction across ROIs (early visual, late visual, and left pVLPFC; Figure 3.3) 
and the degree to which the object state-change ratings predicted either across-time 
multivariate pattern-similarity or across-time activation difference in the BOLD response. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Visual cortex ROIs. (A) Frequency overlap map across subjects for the 
early visual ROI. The early visual ROI was defined separately for each subject as 
the 250 VVC voxels most responsive to feature-scrambled images compared to 
intact objects in a perceptual localizer. (B) Frequency overlap across subjects map 
for the late visual ROI. The late visual ROI was defined as the 250 VVC voxels most 
responsive to intact objects compared to feature-scrambled objects. The maximum 
frequency overlap for the early visual ROI was 13/14 subjects, while the maximum 
frequency overlap for the late visual ROI was 10/14 subjects. Brain regions that are 
shaded in white in the images above were not included in the VVC anatomical mask. 
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Visual Cortex ROIs 
Functional ROIs for early visual cortex and late visual cortex were defined using a 
perceptual localizer task in which subjects viewed alternating blocks of intact and 
feature-scrambled objects while performing a one-back detection task. Late visual cortex 
was defined as the 250 VVC voxels most responsive to intact objects compared to 
feature-scrambled objects, while early visual cortex was defined as the 250 VVC voxels 
most response to feature-scrambled images compared to intact objects. The location of 
the top 250 object-responsive and feature-responsive voxels was quite stereotyped across 
subjects, such that object responsive voxels (late visual cortex) tended to be in lateral 
occipital and fusiform gyri, while feature-responsive voxels (early visual cortex) tended 
to be in inferior occipital and lingual gyri (Figure 3.4). 
 
Stroop-Conflict ROI in left pVLPFC 
Previous studies indicate that left pVLPFC is responsive to conflict at the level of 
semantic representation, and also that the Stroop color-word interference task is a useful 
tool to localize conflict-responsive voxels on an individual-subject basis (January et al., 
2009; Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, & Thompson-Schill, 2012). To determine voxels most 
responsive to conflict on an individual subject level, we identified for each subject the 
250 left pVLPFC voxels with the highest t-statistics in a contrast of conflict trials versus 
neutral trials in a Stroop interference task. In a group-level contrast, left pVLPFC was 
generally more responsive to Stroop conflict than surrounding cortex (Figure 3.5A), 
though the location of the top 250 conflict-responsive voxels varied widely across 
subjects (Figure 3.5B). 
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Figure 3.5. Stroop-conflict ROI in left pVLPFC. (A) Whole-brain group-level 
contrast of conflict trials versus neutral trials in the Stroop color-word interference 
task, thresholded at a corrected alpha of p < .01, and displayed on a partially 
inflated Talairach surface; left pVLPFC is outlined in white. (B) Frequency overlap 
map of the subject-specific Stroop-conflict ROI in left pVLPFC. Each subject-
specific ROI included the 250 voxels in left pVLPFC with the highest within-subject 
t-statistics for the Stroop contrast. The left pVLPFC voxel that had the greatest 
overlap across subjects included 9/14 subjects. 
 
 
Multivariate Pattern-Similarity ROI Analysis 
The extent to which object state-change ratings predicted multivariate pattern-similarity 
reliably varied across the three ROIs (F(2,26) = 5.92, p = .02; Figure 3.5A). Planned 
comparisons further revealed that object state-change reliably predicted multivariate 
pattern-similarity in early visual cortex (t(13) = -2.36, p = .03), but did not reliably 
predict multivariate pattern-similarity in either late visual cortex or left pVLPFC 
(p’s > .1), with a reliable interaction between early visual cortex and left pVLPFC (t(13) 
= 3.57, p = .003). An identical pattern of results was found for the condition-wise 
similarity analysis: object state-change ratings reliably predicted across-time multivariate 
pattern-similarity in early visual cortex (t(13) = -2.19, p = .05), and did not predict 
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multivariate pattern-similarity in either late visual cortex or left pVLPFC (p’s > .4; Figure 
3.5B).  
 
 
 
Fig 3.6. Multivariate pattern-similarity ROI analysis. (A) Degree to which object 
state-change ratings (a continuous variable) predicted pre-action/post-action 
multivariate pattern-similarity in each ROI. (B) Difference between the substantial 
state-change and minimal state-change conditions in pre-action/post-action 
multivariate pattern-similarity for each ROI.  
 
 
Univariate Amplitude-Modulation ROI Analysis 
Continuous object state-change ratings reliably predicted across-time amplitude-
modulation in left pVLPFC, such that greater state-change ratings corresponded with 
greater across-time amplitude differences (t(13) = 2.27, p = .04; Figure 3.6A). 
Additionally, the categorical difference between substantial state-change and minimal 
state-change conditions was reliable in left pVLPFC (t(13) = 2.62, p = .02). In both early 
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and late visual cortex, there were no univariate amplitude-modulation differences 
between conditions, and state-change ratings did not reliably predict univariate 
amplitude-modulation in either visual cortex ROI (p’s > .2). Interactions across ROIs in 
univariate amplitude-modulation did not reach significance (p’s > .1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.7. Univariate amplitude-modulation ROI analysis. (A) Degree to which object 
state-change ratings (a categorical variable) predicted pre-action/post-action 
univariate amplitude-modulation in each ROI. (B) Difference between the 
substantial state-change and minimal state-change conditions in pre-action/post-
action univariate amplitude-modulation for each ROI.  
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VVC-Predicted Univariate Amplitude-Modulation Analysis 
Object state-change ratings and conditions predicted multivariate pattern-similarity in 
early visual cortex, as well as univariate amplitude-modulation in left pVLPFC. This 
suggests that multivariate pattern-similarity in early visual cortex may predict univariate 
amplitude-modulation in left pVLPFC. To test this possibility, we measured for each 
subject the Pearson correlation between multivariate pattern-similarity in both early and 
late visual cortex, and univariate amplitude-modulation in left pVLPFC. Pattern-
similarity in early visual cortex reliably predicted amplitude-modulation in pVLPFC 
(t(13) = -3.35, p = .005; Figure 3.8), while pattern-similarity in late visual cortex failed to 
reliably predict pVLPFC amplitude-modulation (t(13) = -1.42, p = .18). Moreover, 
though not reliably different (t(13) = -1.14, p = .28), the statistical relationship between 
early visual multivariate pattern-similarity and left pVLPFC amplitude-modulation (p 
= .005) appears to be even stronger than the relationship between the object state-change 
ratings and pVLPFC amplitude-modulation (p = .03). 
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Figure 3.8. VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation of pVLPFC. A separate 
regression model was calculated for each subject to measure the extent to which 
multivariate pattern-similarity in the early visual ROI predicted univariate 
amplitude-modulation in the left pVLPFC ROI. Data for each subject is plotted in a 
single color, and includes all trials for that subject. For 13/14 subjects, univariate 
amplitude-modulation in left pVLPFC negatively correlated with multivariate 
pattern-similarity in early visual. The displayed trend line is across data points from 
all subjects. 
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 To test the anatomical specificity of VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-
modulation of left pVLPFC, and also to identify additional cortical region for which pre-
action/post-action univariate amplitude-modulation varied with visual cortex pattern-
similarity, we conducted a whole-brain functional connectivity analysis. For every voxel 
in the brain, we measured the correlation between univariate amplitude-modulation of 
that voxel, and multivariate pattern-similarity in early visual (Figure 3.8B). Multivariate 
pattern-similarity in early visual cortex reliably predicted univariate amplitude-
modulation of voxels in left pVLPFC. The only additional cortical region in which 
univariate amplitude-modulation scaled with early-visual multivariate pattern-similarity 
was the left angular gyrus of the parietal lobe (Figure 3.9; Table 3.1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Whole-brain VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation. Clusters 
of voxels for which univariate amplitude-modulation positive correlated with 
multivariate pattern-similarity in the early visual ROI. This statistical contrast is 
thresholded at p < .01, corrected for multiple comparisons. There were no 
statistically reliable voxel clusters for which univariate amplitude-modulation 
positive correlated with early visual multivariate pattern-similarity. Talairach 
coordinates and anatomical labels indicate the location of the peak voxel of each 
cluster. 
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Table 3.1. Whole-brain VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation. Clusters 
of voxels for which univariate amplitude-modulation positive correlated with early 
visual multivariate pattern-similarity. Contrast is thresholded at p < .01, corrected 
for multiple comparisons. There were no statistically reliable voxel clusters for 
which univariate amplitude-modulation positive correlated with early visual 
multivariate pattern-similarity. Talairach coordinates and anatomical labels indicate 
the location of the peak voxel of each cluster.  
 
 
Discussion 
 Prefrontal cortex is thought to exert executive control over more posterior brain 
regions that store and maintain perceptual information (Miller & Cohen, 2001), and yet 
cognitive control processes in prefrontal cortex are generally studied independently of 
perceptual areas (Fuster, 2008). Using a paradigm in which both perceptual similarity and 
cognitive control demand are precisely manipulated, we simultaneously measured 
competition between a stimulus-driven visual representation of an object and a cognitive 
representation of the same object that subjects constructed based on a described action. 
Through a multivariate pattern-similarity searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006), 
we discovered a striking dissociation between early and late areas of VVC. Searchlight 
spheres that were most sensitive to object state-change tended to be in lingual and inferior 
occipital gyri, overlapped extensively with voxels that responded more strongly to intact 
objects than to feature-scrambled objects in a perceptual localizer, and did not overlap at 
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all with voxels that responded more strongly to feature-scrambled objects than to intact 
objects. 
 In comparing the pre-action and post-action brain states, we found that 
multivariate pattern-similarity and univariate amplitude-modulation double-dissociate 
across three ROIs. In early visual cortex, multivariate pattern-similarity across time 
points was significantly reduced when an object was substantially changed in state, 
compared to when the same object was minimally changed. Moreover, multivariate 
pattern-similarity in early visual cortex varied parametrically with the rated degree to 
which the object was changed in state by the described action. In late visual cortex as 
well as left pVLPFC, multivariate pattern-similarity was invariant to both categorical and 
continuous state-change manipulations. In the ROIs for both early and late visual cortex, 
the univariate amplitude-modulation across pre-action and post-action object states was 
nearly identical across conditions, and was not reliably predicted by the object state-
change ratings.  
 Left pVLPFC dissociated from visual areas in both univariate amplitude-
modulation and multivariate pattern-similarity. In areas of left pVLPFC that were most 
sensitive to conflict in a Stroop color-word identification task, the extent of the univariate 
amplitude-modulation of the BOLD response depended on the degree of object state-
change. Left pVLPFC signal amplitude was greater when subjects imagined an object 
that was substantially different from the immediately preceding photograph, as opposed 
to when they imagined that object in the same state as in the photograph. This left 
pVLPFC univariate amplitude-modulation effect replicates a recent study of object state-
change during event comprehension (Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, & Thompson-Schill, 
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2012), and suggests a specific role for left pVLPFC in representing object state-change 
that involves similar interference resolution mechanisms as described for verb generation, 
control of proactive interference (Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; Jonides & Nee, 2006), 
and resolution of lexical (Rodd et al., 2004; M. Bedny et al., 2008; Hindy et al., 2009) 
and syntactic (Novick et al., 2005; January et al., 2009) ambiguity. However, multivariate 
pattern-similarity in left pVLPFC was invariant to the object state-change manipulation. 
This suggests that neural representations in left pVLPFC are not specific to stimulus 
features that vary across object states. However, since the task was identical for every 
item (i.e., focus on the end state of the object), these data are consistent with an active-
maintenance model of left pVLPFC in which  patterns of neural activation are task-
specific, and not item-specific (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, 
Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005; O’Reilly, Herd, & Pauli, 2010).  
 Multivariate pattern-similarity in early visual cortex predicted the strength of the 
conflict response in left pVLPFC even better than separately-collected ratings of the 
similarity between object states. This predictive relationship between early visual 
multivariate pattern-similarity and left pVLPFC univariate amplitude-modulation is 
among the first examples of functional connectivity between distributed representations 
in posterior brain areas and signal change in frontal cortex.  Multivariate pattern-
similarity effects in early visual cortex build upon mounting evidence for distributed 
object representations in VVC (Haxby et al., 2001; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 
2006), and informs neural models for the “refreshing” of visual memories (e.g., Johnson, 
1992). Previous studies demonstrate that bringing to mind the visual memory of a 
previously viewed image activates the same areas of visual cortex that were activated 
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during image perception (Johnson, Mitchell, Raye, D’Esposito, & Johnson, 2007; Park, 
Chun, & Johnson, 2010). Additionally, the act of refreshing an image that was presented 
just once during encoding enhances repetition attenuation effects to the same extent as 
having viewed the same image twice during encoding (Yi, Turk-Browne, Chun, & 
Johnson, 2008). Recent work has shown that competitive remembering is associated both 
with more ambiguous patterns of VVC reactivation, and with increased activation in 
prefrontal areas (Kuhl, Rissman, Chun, & Wagner, 2011). The VVC-predicted univariate 
amplitude-modulation approach introduced here combines similarity-based fMRI 
analysis of the BOLD response in visual cortex (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Weber et 
al., 2009) with parametric univariate analysis of the BOLD response in prefrontal cortex 
(e.g., Hindy et al., 2012). 
  The anatomical specificity of the VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation 
to left pVLPFC is remarkable (see Figure 3.9 and Table 3.1). Indeed, the only additional 
cortical region in which univariate amplitude-modulation scaled with early visual 
multivariate pattern-similarity was the left angular gyrus of the parietal lobe. Though we 
did not have an a priori hypothesis about parietal cortex involvement in the state-change 
comprehension task, numerous neuroimaging, patient deficit, and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation studies implicate left angular gyrus in the shifting of spatial attention, 
independent of conflict (e.g., Mort et al., 2003; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004; 
Chambers, Payne, Stokes, & Mattingley, 2004). In addition to conflict between 
alternative object representations, it is possible that the substantial state-change items 
required greater shifts of internal spatial attention. The possibility that the VVP-predicted 
amplitude-modulation in angular gyrus reflects internal spatial attention processes is 
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particularly noteworthy in the context of recent evidence and discussions of the 
overlapping neural systems underlying internal and external attention (Kan & Thompson-
Schill, 2004; Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Carrasco, 2011). 
 Data presented here informs our understanding of the mnemonic mechanisms that 
support our ability to juggle representations of mutually exclusive states of the world 
during event processing. We show that representation of object states involves the 
interaction of multiple brain areas, including areas of ventral visual processing pathway 
that are central to visual perception (Ullman, 2000), and areas of prefrontal cortex that are 
necessary for performance of any task which require cognitive control (Fuster, 2008).   
VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation effects suggest that left pVLPFC thus 
appears to exert executive control over posterior brain regions that store and activate 
information, and that biased competition is an integral part of event cognition, enabling 
selection of the context-appropriate representation among competing instantiations of the 
same object as it undergoes change. In this way top-down projections from the prefrontal 
cortex may bias visual and semantic representations in the retrieval of conceptual 
knowledge and maintenance of visual imagery. When the comprehender must resolve the 
interference caused by alternative states of a single object, left pVLPFC may act as a top-
down modulatory signal to bias candidate representations (and the neural patterns that 
instantiate them) toward the context-appropriate representation of the object. 
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Methods 
Subjects 
Fourteen right-handed native English speakers (8 female), aged 22-33 years, participated 
in the study. Subjects were paid $20 per hour and were recruited from within the 
University of Pennsylvania community. All fMRI subjects gave informed consent as 
approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. Additionally, 
204 native English speakers participated online in a task used for stimulus norming. 
 
Stimuli 
fMRI subjects read 20 items from each of the two conditions. Two 
counterbalanced lists were created in which each experimental item occurred in only one 
condition in a list, and across lists every item occurred in all conditions. The only 
difference between the substantial state-change and minimal state-change conditions was 
the described action. Each subject saw each item in only one of the two conditions. (See 
Appendix C for full stimulus set.) 
 Object state-change ratings for each item were collected through an online survey 
(N = 106). The 80 total items were randomly split into two lists, with the constraint that 
each subject rated only one action for each item. For each item, survey subjects were 
presented with the object photograph and just below the photograph, either the minimal 
state-change action or the substantial state-change action. Subjects were asked, “Upon the 
event, will the object stay just the same as it had been before, or will it be changed at 
all?” Subjects rated each item on a 7-point scale ranging from “just the same” to 
“completely changed.” The average state-change rating was 5.28 (SD = 0.77) for 
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substantial state-change items, and 1.39 (SD = 0.77) for minimal state-change items. The 
difference in rated state-change between the substantial state-change and minimal state-
change conditions was reliable (p < .001). Figure 3.1 displays the object state-change 
ratings for each item in the state-change comprehension task, ranked according to its 
object state-change rating, and color-coded by condition (i.e., “substantial state-change” 
or “minimal state-change”). 
 Because we were concerned that conflict effects in left pVLPFC may be 
influenced by the semantic association between objects and actions (e.g., “inflate” and 
“balloon” may be more strongly associated than “pick up” and “balloon”), we also 
collected ratings of the associative strength between each photographed object and 
described action through a separate online survey (N = 98). As in the state-change survey, 
subjects viewed each object photograph individually, with either the minimal state-
change action or the substantial action printed below the photograph. Subjects were 
asked, “How strongly is the following action associated with the depicted object?” 
Subjects rated each item on a 7-point scale ranging from “action not all associated with 
object” to “action extremely associated with object.” The average association-strength 
rating was 5.41 (SD = 1.10) for substantial state-change items, and 3.23 (SD = 0.80) for 
minimal state-change items. This associative-strength difference between conditions was 
reliable (p < .001). Notably, insofar as minimal state-change actions were less associated 
with objects than substantial state-change actions, there should be greater conflict for the 
minimal state-change items than for substantial state-change items. Hypotheses based on 
the associative strength of objects and actions predict the opposite pattern of results from 
hypothesis based on the level of object state-change, as well as from those actually 
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observed for the left pVLPFC conflict ROI. That is, object state-change condition 
predicted univariate amplitude-modulation in the left pVLPFC ROI, despite any 
differences across conditions in the associative of objects and actions. Moreover, 
associative strength did not reliably predict pVLPFC univariate amplitude-modulation 
when treated as a continuous variable (t(13) = 1.00, p = .34). 
 
Procedure 
State-Change Comprehension Task 
The event comprehension portion of the experiment consisted of 40 trials (20 trials of 
each condition), separated across five six-minute runs. Each trial lasted six seconds, 
during which the first sentence was presented for three seconds, followed by the second 
sentence for three seconds. Subjects pressed the two outer buttons of the keypad when the 
second sentence was implausible given the first sentence (e.g., “The man will cook the 
pizza. But first, he will eat the pizza.”). Trials were separated by 3 to 15 seconds of 
jittered fixation, optimized for statistical power by optseq 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). Stimuli for the event comprehension task, as 
well as for the two functional localizers, were presented using E-Prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  
 
Stroop Interference Localizer 
After the event comprehension runs, subjects performed one run of a Stroop color 
identification task, based on previously described procedures. The Stroop task was just 
over 5 minutes in total duration, and the response box was restricted to three buttons: 
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yellow, green, and blue. Stimuli included four trial types: response-eligible conflict, 
response-ineligible conflict, and two groups of neutral trials. Subjects were presented 
with a single word for each trial, and instructed to press the button corresponding to the 
typeface color of each word. Conflict trials could be either response-eligible or response-
ineligible. For response-eligible conflict trials, the color term matched one of the 
subject’s possible responses (i.e., yellow, green, or blue), but always mismatched the 
typeface color. The color terms for response-ineligible conflict trials (orange, brown, or 
red) also mismatched the typeface color, but were not possible responses. Separate sets of 
non-color neutral trials (e.g., farmer, stage, tax) were intermixed with the response-
eligible and response-ineligible conflict trials. 
 
Perceptual Localizer 
The final run of scanning was a 6-minute functional localizer to identify object-selective 
regions of interest (ROIs) in lateral occipital and posterior fusiform areas of visual cortex. 
During the localizer run, subjects viewed intact and feature-scrambled objects while 
performing a one-back task.  
 
fMRI Image Acquisition 
Structural and functional data were collected on a 3-T Siemens Trio system and a 32-
channel array head coil. Structural data included axial T1-weighted localizer images with 
160 slices and 1mm isotropic voxels (TR = 1620 ms, TE = 3.87 ms, TI = 950 ms). 
Functional data included echo-planar fMRI performed in 44 axial slices and 3 mm 
isotropic voxels (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms). Twelve seconds preceded data acquisition 
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in each functional run to approach steady-state magnetization. 
 
Image Processing & Analysis 
Image preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using AFNI (Cox, 1996) 
and visualized in SUMA. Functional data were sinc interpolated to correct for slice 
timing, and aligned to the mean of all functional images using a six parameter iterated 
least squares procedure. The functional data were then registered with the subject’s 
anatomical dataset, normalized to a standard template in Talairach space, and smoothed 
with a 4 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Finally, all time-series data were z-normalized 
within each run. Each condition was modeled with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function, and beta coefficients were estimated using a modified general linear model that 
included a restricted maximum likelihood estimation of the temporal auto-correlation 
structure, with a polynomial baseline fit and six motion parameters as covariates of no 
interest. 
Regions of interest were defined both anatomically and functionally. Anatomical 
ROIs were defined in Talairach space using probabilistic cytoarchitectonic probabilistic 
maps provided in the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005). VVC was 
anatomically constrained to bilateral ventral occipitotemporal cortex, including included 
inferior occipital cortex, lingual gyrus, and the posterior aspects of fusiform gyrus and 
inferior temporal gyrus. Across all subjects, the anatomical definition of VVC included 
an average of 4059 voxels (SD = 77). Across all subjects, the anatomical definition of 
VVC included an average of 801 voxels (SD = 33). Within the broad anatomical 
constraints of bilateral VVC and left pVLPFC, ROIs were functionally defined separately 
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for each subject using the perceptual localizer (blocks of intact and feature-scrambled 
objects) and the Stroop color-word interference task. The late visual ROI was defined as 
the 250 VVC voxels most responsive to intact objects compared to feature-scrambled 
objects, while the early visual ROI was defined as the 250 VVC voxels most response to 
feature-scrambled images compared to intact objects. Left pVLPFC was anatomically 
constrained to BA 44 (pars opercularis), BA 45 (pars triangularis), and inferior frontal 
sulcus. The pVLPFC conflict ROI comprised the 250 voxels with the highest t-statistics 
in a contrast of conflict trials (either response-eligible or response-ineligible) vs. neutral 
trials during the Stroop interference task. Statistical tests were based either on the mean 
amplitude difference (univariate amplitude-modulation) or Pearson correlation 
(multivariate pattern-similarity) across time points of the 250 voxels of each ROI, and 
were evaluated at the two-tailed .05 level of significance.  
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine. 
– The Principles of Psychology (William James, 1890) 
 
 Event comprehension requires the ability to represent, recall, and imagine 
individual objects in multiple distinct states. We begin with the observation that physical 
object state-changes, as they occur in the world, involve distinct and mutually exclusive 
states of the same object at different times. The experiments described in Chapters 2 and 
3 test the hypothesis that incompatible physical object states correspond to incompatible 
brain states, and that the cognitive system must therefore resolve conflict among 
incompatible representations. In other words, comprehension of an object state-change 
comes at a competitive cost. We tested this hypothesis by measuring univariate 
amplitude-modulation and multivariate pattern-similarity of the fMRI BOLD response 
within specific brain areas while subjects performed state-change comprehension tasks. 
These measured brain areas were functionally and anatomically defined as either 
specifically sensitive to semantic conflict (left pVLPFC) or to underlie the visual 
representation of objects and their features (early and late VVC).  
 In Chapter 2, we described a pair of fMRI experiments that test whether 
comprehension of object state-change described through language evokes a neural 
response in prefrontal cortex that is the same as for known forms of conflict. Specific 
manipulations of object state-change in these two experiments complement one another. 
In the first experiment, the same object was described as being changed either 
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substantially or minimally by one of two actions. In the second experiment, the same 
action was described as either substantially or minimally changing one of two objects. By 
separately varying the described action and the described object across experiments, we 
avoid differences in pVLPFC activation being due to changes in the verb alone or the 
object alone. On a subject-specific basis, we identified voxels most responsive to conflict 
in a Stroop color-word interference task, and discovered a triple dissociation across ROIs 
in left pVLPFC, left MFG, and left MTG. Voxels in left pVLPFC most responsive to 
Stroop conflict were also responsive to the object state-change manipulation, yet were not 
responsive to the imageability of described events; voxels in left MFG responsive to 
Stroop conflict were not responsive even to language; and voxels in left MTG that were 
responsive to language and imageability were not responsive to object-change. Results 
from the experiments in Chapter 2 suggest that, when representing object state-change, 
incompatible representations of an object compete in working memory, and the greater 
the difference between the initial and end states of an object, the greater the conflict.  
 In Chapter 3, we went beyond inferring the maintenance of multiple incompatible 
object state representations based on the need for control from frontal cortex. At the same 
time that we measured the prefrontal conflict response, we used multi-voxel pattern 
analysis to directly measure distributed object representations in ventral visual cortex 
when an initially depicted object was imagined to be minimally or substantially changed 
by a described action. We found that the similarity of object states before and after a 
described event predicts not only the strength of the prefrontal cortex conflict response, 
but also the multivariate pattern-similarity of brain states in early visual cortex. In early 
visual cortex, multivariate pattern-similarity across time points before and after a 
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described action was reliably reduced when the object was substantially changed, 
compared to when the object was minimally changed. In late visual cortex, multivariate 
pattern-similarity across time points was invariant to object state-change. Moreover, 
multivariate pattern-similarity in early visual cortex predicts the strength of prefrontal 
cortex conflict response even better than do the stimulus ratings of object state-change. 
Results suggest that distinct states of an object correspond to distinct visual cortex 
representations, and that the greater the dissimilarity between object states, the greater the 
dissimilarity between brain states, and the greater the conflict. 
 Considered together, the three fMRI experiments reported here suggest that 
distinct and incompatible representations of an object compete when representing object 
state-change. Below, we first address specific questions regarding the nature of 
competing object representations and the mechanisms involved in resolving this conflict. 
We then relate our present findings to object-based research in the field of visual 
attention, which we find to synergistically inform and be informed by our understanding 
of object state-change and semantic conflict.  
 
Simulation versus Interference 
 Because the left pVLPFC Stroop-conflict ROI in each of the three experiments 
was functionally and anatomically constrained to include only voxels most responsive to 
semantic conflict, we interpret the observed effect of object state-change on signal 
amplitude in this ROI as reflecting conflict between incompatible object states. However, 
a statistical relationship between any independent variable and the signal amplitude of an 
ROI does not by itself allow a strong inference about the presence of a particular 
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cognitive process (Friston & Price, 2003; Henson, 2005; Poldrack, 2006). Indeed, an 
alternative account of the observed parametric effects is that signal amplitude in left 
pVLPFC is driven by mental simulation of object state-change, as opposed to conflict 
between object-state representations (cf. Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & 
Wilson, 2003). According to the proposed conflict account of signal amplitude in left 
pVLPFC, state-change comprehension requires the cognitive system to maintain multiple 
incompatible representations of an object (changed and unchanged), and signal amplitude 
in left pVLPFC depends on the amount conflict between these incompatible object 
representations. According to a simulation account of left pVLPFC signal amplitude, the 
cognitive system would maintain only a single representation of acorn, and serially 
transform this representation as needed. The more an object is changed in state during an 
event, the more information must be inferred to derive the context-appropriate 
representation of the same object in its new state. In this case, signal change in left 
pVLPFC would depend on the amount of simulation required to comprehend the event 
sequence. We can, however, rule out a simulation account of the data by considering (1) 
the temporal-sequence manipulation in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2, and (2) the univariate 
amplitude-modulation effect described in Chapter 3 for left pVLPFC.  
 The temporal-sequence manipulation in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2 particularly is 
useful for distinguishing between a conflict account and a simulation account of the 
object state-change effects in left pVLPFC. In that experiment, multiple distinct 
representations of an object were introduced in the first sentence of substantial state-
change items. For instance, an intact acorn and a cracked acorn are each implied by the 
first sentence “The squirrel will crack the acorn.” In the second sentence of these items, a 
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temporal connective (‘and then’ or ‘but first’), determined whether the object-state in 
focus is the changed state of the object or its original state. For instance, the temporal 
connective determines whether the acorn in focus is cracked or intact in the sentence 
“And then / But first the squirrel will lick the acorn.” Conflict and simulation accounts 
make different predictions regarding the temporal context manipulation in Experiment 1. 
The conflict account predicts that there will always be greater pVLPFC activation when 
an object is changed in state, regardless of the temporal sequence. The simulation account 
predicts an interaction with temporal context in Experiment 1, because in the ‘and then’ 
case, the state computed at the end of the first sentence is identical to that referred to at 
the end of the second (but would be different in the ‘but first’ case). Insofar as the data 
from Experiment 1 revealed a main effect for state-change and no interaction with 
temporal sequence, a conflict account fits the data better than a simulation account, 
suggesting that the single-instantiation account is unlikely. 
 Data from Chapter 3 are also useful in distinguishing between conflict and 
simulation accounts of left pVLPFC activation. The design of the experiment in Chapter 
3 permitted us to separately model each trial component: the object before state-change, 
the object during state-change, and the object after state-change. A simulation account 
predicts that, though substantial state-changes will correspond to increased pVLPFC 
signal amplitude during the state-change, there should be no difference between minimal 
and substantial state-change conditions in the pVLPFC amplitude-modulation measure 
(i.e., no difference in signal amplitude between the pre-action and post-action trial 
components). However, as predicted by the proposed conflict account, we found that the 
extent of pVLPFC amplitude-modulation was predicted by both the rated state-change of 
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the item and the corresponding pattern-similarity in visual cortex. Thus, both the 
temporal-sequence data in Chapter 2 and the amplitude-modulation data in Chapter 3 
strengthen the inference made here that condition-wise and item-wise differences in left 
pVLPFC signal amplitude are driven by conflict between incompatible representations of 
an object.  
 
Typicality of Object States 
 Typicality may affect the saliency of the object-state representations. In many of 
the experimental items in Chapter 2, the described object begins in a very typical or 
canonical state (e.g., an intact acorn) and is altered to a more unusual state (e.g., a 
cracked acorn). Literature on typicality effects in language comprehension suggest that 
the strength of the initially activated object representation may partially determine the 
extent to which this initial representation remains active even after the contextually 
appropriate object representation has been computed (e.g., Rosch, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988; 
Southgate & Meints, 2000). Also, in computational models of lexical ambiguity in the 
comprehension of polysemous words, mental representations of word meanings are 
viewed as stable states within a semantic space that is shaped not only by context, but 
also by the relative frequency of word interpretations (Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; 
Klein & Murphy, 2001; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2004). Thus, though both the 
cracked and intact acorn representations are available to the cognitive system in the 
example above, the intact acorn representation may be more salient because it is closer to 
the prototypical acorn. Interestingly, these models of word typicality suggest that there 
should be less conflict for state-change for item such as “the musician will tune the 
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piano,” in which in the object goes from a less typical state (an out-of-tune piano) to a 
more typical state (a tuned piano).  
 While questions about the effects of object-state typicality on state-change 
comprehension promise an interesting avenue for future research, they are difficult to 
address within the data sets described in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, the initial object 
state is unconstrained for minimal state-change items in each experiment. For instance, in 
the event “the squirrel will crack the acorn,” it is implied that the initial state of the acorn 
is intact. However, in the event “the squirrel will sniff the acorn,” it is not necessary or 
even implied that the initial state of the acorn is intact; the squirrel could just as likely 
sniff a cracked acorn. Thus, though we can measure object-state typicality for substantial 
state-change items in the Chapter 2 experiments, we cannot (without strong assumptions) 
measure object-state typicality for the minimal state-change items. The Chapter 3 
experiment does not have this indeterminacy problem, as subjects are shown a 
photograph of the initial object state before each trial. However, in that experiment, the 
strength of the initial visual representation would likely mask any typicality effects of 
object states. In order to systematically vary the relative typicality of the initial state and 
end state of both substantially and minimally changed objects, future experiments will 
include an adjective that specifies the original state of each object. This adjective will 
constrain the initial object state for minimal state-change items as well as substantial 
state-change items, without visual memory processes masking possible typicality effects. 
In such an experiment, we may find that the relative typicality of the initial and end states 
of the object interacts with state-change. Such a pattern of results may suggest a two-
factor conflict model (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) for 
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left pVLPFC, in which conflict and pVLPFC amplitude depend on the combined 
influence of the relative strength of incompatible object-state representations, and the 
similarity of the incompatible object-state representations to one another. 
 
Object Rivalry 
 Similarity-based interference between distinct items in memory is not a new 
concept. Effects of semantic, syntactic, and phonological overlap among items has been 
observed in short-term memory (Baddeley & Dale, 1966; Shulman, 1971), long-term 
memory (Postman & Underwood, 1973; Anderson, Green, & McCulloch, 2000), and 
sentence comprehension (Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson, & Lee, 2006; Van Dyke & 
McElree, 2006). In each of these instances, greater similarity among items (i.e., semantic, 
syntactic, or phonological overlap) leads to greater interference. But this is precisely 
opposite to the interference effects that we observed in each fMRI experiment described 
in Chapters 2 and 3. In all three experiments, the amount of change that the object 
underwent positively correlated with the amplitude of the BOLD response in those 
Stroop-responsive voxels. That is, the more dissimilar alternative object representations 
were to one another, the greater the semantic conflict. Thus, it was not similarity-based 
interference that we found, but dissimilarity-based interference. This may be because 
greater change in object state corresponds to a greater the number of semantic features in 
conflict between object instantiations. We conjecture that this difference between distinct 
objects (similarity-based interference) and distinct instantiations of a single object 
(dissimilarity-based interference) has its roots in the fact that the distinct instantiations of 
an object across event-time (i.e., before and after state-change) are mutually exclusive – 
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they cannot co-exist. This mutual exclusivity must manifest in inhibition stemming from 
the non-overlapping elements of the instantiations (and hence the greater the difference 
between the two, the greater the mutual inhibition). Distinct objects, on the other hand, 
can co-exist no matter how similar; the greater the overlap between the objects’ 
representations, the greater the interference, but differences between the objects do not 
have consequences for coexistence and are not inhibitory. This may be analogous to a 
percept that alternates between incompatible retinal inputs during binocular rivalry 
(Logothetis, Leopold, & Sheinberg, 1996; Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 
1998), or a percept that alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations of an 
ambiguous figure during multistable perception (Sterzer, Kleinschmidt, & Rees, 2009; 
Long & Toppino, 2004). 
 An interesting avenue for future research will be to examine the difference 
between representing distinct objects versus representing distinct states of the same 
object. For instance, using a paradigm similar to that described in Chapter 3, a subject 
may see a photograph of a blue balloon, then follow task instructions to “remember the 
blue balloon” and then “inflate the blue balloon” and finally “look at the red balloon.” In 
this case, the “before” and “after” object representations would be distinct objects that are 
visually similar and within the same category. If late visual cortex (which responds more 
strongly to intact objects than to feature-scrambled objects) codes for object identity (e.g., 
DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Cichy, Chen, & Haynes, 2011) patterns of neural activation in this 
ROI may appear more dynamic than in the experiment described in Chapter 3. However, 
if late visual cortex codes for object category (e.g, Haxby et al., 2001; Kourtzi & Connor, 
2011), multivariate pattern-similarity in this area may be invariant to this identity 
 
 
83 
 
manipulation, just as it was to the state-change manipulation. To additionally manipulate 
object category within the same experimental paradigm, visual imagery instructions may 
proceed as “remember the balloon,” followed by “inflate the balloon,” followed by “look 
at the basketball.” In addition to VVC multivariate pattern-similarity, such manipulations 
of object identity and object category may also affect the observed functional 
connectivity relationship (i.e., VVC-predicted univariate amplitude-modulation) between 
early visual cortex and left pVLPFC. 
 
Bridging Constructs: Object Files & Biased Competition 
 In the same way that functional connectivity can relate multivariate pattern-
similarity in visual cortex to signal amplitude in prefrontal cortex, considerations of 
object state-change link models of object representation (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman, & 
Gibbs, 1992; Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001) with models of the top-down control 
of attention (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Desimone, 1998). Although these 
frameworks have been considered primarily in the context of visual perception, 
increasing evidence points to the cognitive and neural overlap of the cognitive and neural 
systems that guide “external attention” to perceptual representations, and “internal 
attention” to mental representations (Nobre et al., 2004; Chun et al., 2011). 
 The “object files” construct in visual attention is particularly useful for 
considering the cognitive mechanisms that might link object states to one another. In this 
construct, object files are mid-level representations for identifying and tracking objects 
through time and space (Kahneman et al., 1992; Xu & Chun, 2009). When a visual 
stimulus is attended, the observer must determine whether this stimulus is novel or 
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belongs to an existing object file. If the stimulus is novel, a new object file is established, 
and is maintained even after the stimulus is out of sight (e.g., behind an occluder). If a 
stimulus includes features that match those of an existing object file, the observer 
automatically retrieves that object's past characteristics, which in turn influence the 
perceptual experience of the stimulus. Importantly, though the visual system typically 
prioritizes spatiotemporal information in assigning object files (e.g., two different-
looking objects are treated as the same when one transitions smoothly to the other, while 
two similar-looking objects are treated as different when they appear over time 
discontinuously), semantic knowledge can influence and override spatiotemporal 
information. Whether the visual system tolerates interruptions of spatiotemporal 
continuity depends both on general knowledge, such as naïve physics, and specific 
semantic and episodic memories for the action affordances and potential states of each 
object (Carey & Xu, 2001). Two object instantiations (e.g., an egg that is broken, or a 
frog that turns into a prince) can be perceived as the same object despite discontinuities, 
if the initial object state and an intervening action together suggest a state-change.  
 Biased competition refers to the process through which top-down signals guide 
competitive interactions between mutually inhibitory ensembles of interconnected 
neurons (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001). In this model, the 
prefrontal cortex influences attention through excitatory pathways that increase the firing 
rate within neural populations of low-level visual cortex that code for specific task-
relevant features. In turn, increased firing rate of these feature-specific neural populations 
inhibits the firing rate of other surrounding neural populations. Kan & Thompson-Schill 
(2004) extended the biased competition model beyond perception, to semantic retrieval. 
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Attention to competing internal representations (e.g., incompatible object states) is 
described a two-component process of lateral inhibition and top-down constraint.  
 Data reported here suggest that competition between object states is a necessary 
component of event cognition, and that the visual attention frameworks of object files and 
biased competition are together useful in modeling state-change comprehension. Through 
the lens of object files, we can better understand how the cognitive system can treat two 
completely dissimilar neural representations as a single object. And through the lens of 
biased competition, we can better understand how alternative states of the same object 
compete in ventral visual cortex, at the same that task-specific neural patterns in 
prefrontal cortex bias these feature-based neural patterns toward the context-appropriate 
representation of an object. 
 
Conclusions 
Event comprehension often requires us to represent states of the world that are 
necessarily mutually exclusive from one another. Through a series of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging experiments, we test the hypothesis that, when an object is described 
as changing state during an event, the cognitive system must resolve conflict between the 
resulting incompatible brain states. In Chapter 2, we show that the degree of object state-
change entailed by a described event predicts fMRI signal amplitude in left pVLPFC, an 
area known to be sensitive to semantic conflict, and that this neural response specifically 
overlaps with conflict-dependent signal on a Stroop interference task. By separately 
varying the described action and the described object across Experiments 1 and 2, we 
avoid changes in left pVLPFC activation being due to changes in the verb alone (Expt. 1) 
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or the object alone (Expt. 2). In Chapter 3, we show that degree of object state-change 
also predicts the similarity of distributed patterns of fMRI activation in ventral visual 
cortex, and that this multivariate pattern-similarity of incompatible brain states in visual 
cortex is an even stronger predictor of pVLPFC activation than the rated degree of object 
state-change. Specific recruitment of pVLPFC during state-change comprehension 
suggests conflict at the level of semantic representations. Results from these experiments 
suggest that distinct and incompatible representations of an object compete when 
representing object state-change, that alternative states of an object correspond to distinct 
visual cortex representations, and that conflict measured in prefrontal cortex is mediated 
by the similarity of distributed representations in visual cortex. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Experiment 1 event comprehension items (object fixed, action varied). Full stimulus 
set of 120 items. Each subject saw each item in only one of the four conditions. All 
items contain the same object in all conditions. 
 
A and B = action minimally changes object 
C and D = action substantially changes object 
 
1. 
A) The lumberjack will point at the tree branch. But first, he will reach for the tree 
branch. 
B) The lumberjack will point at the tree branch. And then, he will reach for the tree 
branch. 
C) The lumberjack will saw off the tree branch. But first, he will reach for the tree 
branch. 
D) The lumberjack will saw off the tree branch. And then, he will reach for the tree 
branch. 
 
2. 
A) The girl will gaze through the window. But first, she will kneel beside the window. 
B) The girl will gaze through the window. And then, she will kneel beside the window. 
C) The girl will open up the window. But first, she will kneel beside the window. 
D) The girl will open up the window. And then, she will kneel beside the window. 
 
3. 
A) The boy will yell at the jack-in-the-box. But first, he will frown at the jack-in-the-box. 
B) The boy will yell at the jack-in-the-box. And then, he will frown at the jack-in-the-
box. 
C) The boy will pop open the jack-in-the-box. But first, he will frown at the jack-in-the-
box. 
D) The boy will pop open the jack-in-the-box. And then, he will frown at the jack-in-the-
box. 
 
4.   
A) The woman will pick out the apple. But first, she will talk about the apple. 
B) The woman will pick out the apple. And then, she will talk about the apple. 
C) The woman will bite into the apple. But first, she will talk about the apple. 
D) The woman will bite into the apple. And then, she will talk about the apple. 
 
5.   
A) The child will lick the Popsicle. But first, she will grin at the Popsicle. 
B) The child will lick the Popsicle. And then, she will grin at the Popsicle. 
C) The child will unwrap the Popsicle. But first, she will grin at the Popsicle. 
D) The child will unwrap the Popsicle. And then, she will grin at the Popsicle. 
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6. 
A) The expert will examine the Rubik’s Cube. But first, he will explain the Rubik’s Cube. 
B) The expert will examine the Rubik’s Cube. And then, he will explain the Rubik’s 
Cube. 
C) The expert will solve the Rubik’s Cube. But first, he will explain the Rubik’s Cube. 
D) The expert will solve the Rubik’s Cube. And then, he will explain the Rubik’s Cube. 
 
7.   
A) The boy will inspect the broken zipper. But first, he will complain about the zipper. 
B) The boy will inspect the broken zipper. And then, he will complain about the zipper. 
C) The boy will fix the broken zipper. But first, he will complain about the zipper 
D) The boy will fix the broken zipper. And then, he will complain about the zipper. 
 
8. 
A) The child will tap the ketchup bottle. But first, he will comment on the ketchup bottle. 
B) The child will tap the ketchup bottle. And then, he will comment on the ketchup 
bottle. 
C) The child will open the ketchup bottle. But first, he will comment on the ketchup 
bottle. 
D) The child will open the ketchup bottle. And then, he will comment on the ketchup 
bottle. 
 
9. 
A) The fireman will grip the fire hose. But first, he will ask about the hose. 
B) The fireman will grip the fire hose. And then, he will ask about the hose. 
C) The fireman will unravel the fire hose. But first, he will ask about the hose. 
D) The fireman will unravel the fire hose. And then, he will ask about the hose. 
 
10. 
A) The grouch will curse at the alarm clock. But first, he will hit the alarm clock. 
B) The grouch will curse at the alarm clock. And then, he will hit the alarm clock. 
C) The grouch will turn off the alarm clock. But first, he will hit the alarm clock. 
D) The grouch will turn off the alarm clock. And then, he will hit the alarm clock. 
 
11. 
A) The teenager will bang on the trashcan. But first, he will walk around the trashcan. 
B) The teenager will bang on the trashcan. And then, he will walk around the trashcan. 
C) The teenager will tip over the trashcan. But first, he will walk around the trashcan. 
D) The teenager will tip over the trashcan. And then, he will walk around the trashcan. 
 
12. 
A) The mother will select the egg. But first, she will talk about the egg. 
B) The mother will select the egg. And then, she will talk about the egg. 
C) The mother will crack the egg. But first, she will talk about the egg. 
D) The mother will crack the egg. And then, she will talk about the egg. 
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13. 
A) The groomer will pet the dog. But first, he will feed the dog. 
B) The groomer will pet the dog. And then, he will feed the dog. 
C) The groomer will shave the dog. But first he will feed the dog. 
D) The groomer will shave the dog. And then, he will feed the dog. 
 
14. 
A) The artist will stare at the blank canvas. But first, he will ponder the canvas. 
B) The artist will stare at the blank canvas. And then, he will ponder the canvas. 
C) The artist will paint on the blank canvas. But first, he will ponder the canvas. 
D) The artist will paint on the blank canvas. And then, he will ponder the canvas. 
 
15. 
A) The boy will shake the empty water gun. But first, he will giggle about the water gun. 
B) The boy will shake the empty water gun. And then, he will giggle about the water gun. 
C) The boy will fill the empty water gun. But first, he will giggle about the water gun. 
D) The boy will fill the empty water gun. And then, he will giggle about the water gun. 
 
16. 
A) The plumber will examine the pipe. But first, he will frown at the pipe. 
B) The plumber will examine the pipe. And then, he will frown at the pipe. 
C) The plumber will bend the pipe. But first, he will frown at the pipe. 
D) The plumber will bend the pipe. And then, he will frown at the pipe. 
 
17. 
A) The bride will accept the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
B) The bride will accept the gift. And then, she will give thanks for the gift. 
C) The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
D) The bride will unwrap the gift. And then, she will give thanks for the gift. 
 
18.   
A) The bartender will select the tequila bottle. But first, he will talk about the tequila 
bottle. 
B) The bartender will select the tequila bottle. And then, he will talk about the tequila 
bottle. 
C) The bartender will empty the tequila bottle. But first, he will talk about the tequila 
bottle. 
D) The bartender will empty the tequila bottle. And then, he will talk about the tequila 
bottle. 
 
19. 
A) The sailor will hold onto the sail. But first, he will scowl at the sail. 
B) The sailor will hold onto the sail. And then, he will scowl at the sail. 
C) The sailor will take down the sail. But first, he will scowl at the sail. 
D) The sailor will take down the sail. And then, he will scowl at the sail. 
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20. 
A) The office worker will type on the keyboard. But first, he will complain about the 
keyboard. 
B) The office worker will type on the keyboard. And then, he will complain about the 
keyboard. 
C) The office worker will plug in the keyboard. But first, he will complain about the 
keyboard. 
D) The office worker will plug in the keyboard. And then, he will complain about the 
keyboard. 
 
21. 
A) The squirrel will sniff the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
B) The squirrel will sniff the acorn. And then, it will lick the acorn. 
C) The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
D) The squirrel will crack the acorn. And then, it will lick the acorn. 
 
22. 
A) The carpenter will sift through the toolbox. But first, he will frown at the toolbox. 
B) The carpenter will sift through the toolbox. And then, he will frown at the toolbox. 
C) The carpenter will open up the toolbox. But first, he will frown at the toolbox. 
D) The carpenter will open up the toolbox. And then, he will frown at the toolbox. 
 
23. 
A) The gorilla will inspect the banana. But first, he will grunt at the banana. 
B) The gorilla will inspect the banana. And then, he will grunt at the banana. 
C) The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at the banana. 
D) The gorilla will peel the banana. And then, he will grunt at the banana. 
 
24. 
A) The construction worker will bang on the wall. But first, he will frown at the wall. 
B) The construction worker will bang on the wall. And then, he will frown at the wall. 
C) The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, he will frown at the wall. 
D) The construction worker will knock down the wall. And then, he will frown at the 
wall. 
 
25. 
A) The boy will rub the coin. But first, he will grin at the coin. 
B) The boy will rub the coin. And then, he will grin at the coin. 
C) The boy will spin the coin. But first, he will grin at the coin. 
D) The boy will spin the coin. And then, he will grin at the coin. 
 
26.   
A) The boy will examine his shoes. But first, he will brag about his shoes. 
B) The boy will examine his shoes. And then, he will brag about his shoes. 
C) The boy will untie his shoes. But first, he will brag about his shoes. 
D) The boy will untie his shoes. And then, he will brag about his shoes. 
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27. 
A) The teacher will point at the blackboard. But first, she will read from the blackboard. 
B) The teacher will point at the blackboard. And then, she will read from the blackboard. 
C) The teacher will draw on the blackboard. But first, she will read from the blackboard. 
D) The teacher will draw on the blackboard. And then, she will read from the blackboard. 
 
28. 
A) The girl will pose behind the shirt. But first, she will ask about the shirt. 
B) The girl will pose behind the shirt. And then, she will ask about the shirt. 
C) The girl will hang up the shirt. But first, she will ask about the shirt. 
D) The girl will hang up the shirt. And then, she will ask about the shirt. 
  
29. 
A) The tour guide will inspect the umbrella. But first, she will clench the umbrella. 
B) The tour guide will inspect the umbrella. And then, she will clench the umbrella. 
C) The tour guide will open the umbrella. But first, she will clench the umbrella. 
D) The tour guide will open the umbrella. And then, she will clench the umbrella. 
  
30. 
A) The gymnast will examine the jump rope. But first, she will complain about the jump 
rope. 
B) The gymnast will examine the jump rope. And then, she will complain about the jump 
rope. 
C) The gymnast will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about the jump rope. 
D) The gymnast will cut the jump rope. And then, she will complain about the jump rope. 
 
31. 
A) The airline pilot will admire his hat. But first, he will chat about his hat. 
B) The airline pilot will admire his hat. And then, he will chat about his hat. 
C) The airline pilot will remove his hat. But first, he will chat about his hat. 
D) The airline pilot will remove his hat. And then, he will chat about his hat. 
 
32. 
A) The zookeeper will count the animals. But first, he will chat about the animals. 
B) The zookeeper will count the animals. And then, he will chat about the animals. 
C) The zookeeper will release the animals. But first, he will chat about the animals. 
D) The zookeeper will release the animals. And then, he will chat about the animals. 
 
33. 
A) The teacher will glare at the paper. But first, she will reread the paper. 
B) The teacher will glare at the paper. And then, she will reread the paper. 
C) The teacher will mark up the paper. But first, she will reread the paper. 
D) The teacher will mark up the paper. And then, she will reread the paper. 
 
34.   
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A) The babysitter will trip over the toy truck. But first, she will grumble about the truck. 
B) The babysitter will trip over the toy truck. And then, she will grumble about the truck. 
C) The babysitter will put away the toy truck. But first, she will grumble about the truck. 
D) The babysitter will put away the toy truck. And then, she will grumble about the truck. 
 
35. 
A) The secretary will search the files. But first, she will gripe about the files. 
B) The secretary will search the files. And then, she will gripe about the files. 
C) The secretary will shred the files. But first, she will gripe about the files. 
D) The secretary will shred the files. And then, she will gripe about the files. 
 
36.   
A) The dog will nudge his food bowl. But first, he will smell his food bowl. 
B) The dog will nudge his food bowl. And then, he will smell his food bowl. 
C) The dog will empty his food bowl. But first, he will smell his food bowl. 
D) The dog will empty his food bowl. And then, he will smell his food bowl. 
 
37. 
A) The boxer will step toward his opponent. But first, he will taunt his opponent. 
B) The boxer will step toward his opponent. And then, he will taunt his opponent. 
C) The boxer will knock out his opponent. But first, he will taunt his opponent. 
D) The boxer will knock out his opponent. And then, he will taunt his opponent. 
 
38. 
A) The little girl will kiss her teddy bear. But first, she will talk to her teddy bear. 
B) The little girl will kiss her teddy bear. And then, she will talk to her teddy bear. 
C) The little girl will dress her teddy bear. But first, she will talk to her teddy bear. 
D) The little girl will dress her teddy bear. And then, she will talk to her teddy bear. 
  
39. 
A) The aunt will count up the leftover Halloween candy. But first, she will grimace at the 
candy. 
B) The aunt will count up the leftover Halloween candy. And then, she will grimace at the 
candy. 
C) The aunt will dump out the leftover Halloween candy. But first, she will grimace at the 
candy. 
D) The aunt will dump out the leftover Halloween candy. And then, she will grimace at 
the candy. 
 
40. 
A) The teenager will interpret the Magic 8-Ball. But first, she will chat about the Magic 
8-Ball. 
B) The teenager will interpret the Magic 8-Ball. And then, she will chat about the Magic 
8-Ball. 
C) The teenager will shake the Magic 8-Ball. But first, she will chat about the Magic 8-
Ball. 
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D) The teenager will shake the Magic 8-Ball. And then, she will chat about the Magic 8-
Ball. 
 
41. 
A) The maid will sit upon the messy bed. But first, she will complain about the bed. 
B) The maid will sit upon the messy bed. And then, she will complain about the bed. 
C) The maid will make up the messy bed. But first, she will complain about the bed. 
D) The maid will make up the messy bed. And then, she will complain about the bed. 
 
42. 
A) The beaver will circle around the tree. But first, he will push against the tree. 
B) The beaver will circle around the tree. And then, he will push against the tree. 
C) The beaver will chew through the tree. But first, he will push against the tree. 
D) The beaver will chew through the tree. And then, he will push against the tree. 
  
43. 
A) The farmer will select the pumpkin. But first, he will chat about the pumpkin 
B) The farmer will select the pumpkin. And then, he will chat about the pumpkin. 
C) The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will chat about the pumpkin. 
D) The farmer will carve the pumpkin. And then, he will chat about the pumpkin. 
 
44. 
A) The boy will smile at the candle. But first, he will reach for the candle. 
B) The boy will smile at the candle. And then, he will reach for the candle. 
C) The boy will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for the candle. 
D) The boy will blow out the candle. And then, he will reach for the candle. 
  
45. 
A) The clown will rub the balloon. But first, he will laugh at the balloon. 
B) The clown will rub the balloon. And then, he will laugh at the balloon. 
C) The clown will inflate the balloon. But first, he will laugh at the balloon. 
D) The clown will inflate the balloon. And then, he will laugh at the balloon. 
  
46. 
A) The student will write with the pencil. But first, she will clench the pencil. 
B) The student will write with the pencil. And then, she will clench the pencil. 
C) The student will sharpen up the pencil. But first, she will clench the pencil. 
D) The student will sharpen up the pencil. And then, she will clench the pencil. 
  
47. 
A) The child will hide behind the plant. But first, he will jump over the plant. 
B) The child will hide behind the plant. And then, he will jump over the plant. 
C) The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over the plant. 
D) The child will knock down the plant. And then, he will jump over the plant. 
  
48. 
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A) The musician will play the piano. But first, he will rave about the piano. 
B) The musician will play the piano. And then, he will rave about the piano. 
C) The musician will tune the piano. But first, he will rave about the piano. 
D) The musician will tune the piano. And then, he will rave about the piano. 
  
49. 
A) The alley cat will follow the mouse. But first, she will hiss at the mouse. 
B) The alley cat will follow the mouse. And then, she will hiss at the mouse. 
C) The alley cat will injure the mouse. But first, she will hiss at the mouse. 
D) The alley cat will injure the mouse. And then, she will hiss at the mouse. 
  
50. 
A) The toddler will look over the puzzle. But first, he will marvel at the puzzle. 
B) The toddler will look over the puzzle. And then, he will marvel at the puzzle. 
C) The toddler will break apart the puzzle. But first, he will marvel at the puzzle. 
D) The toddler will break apart the puzzle. And then, he will marvel at the puzzle. 
  
51. 
A) The passerby will watch the bird. But first, she will call to the bird. 
B) The passerby will watch the bird. And then, she will call to the bird. 
C) The passerby will frighten the bird. But first, she will call to the bird. 
D) The passerby will frighten the bird. And then, she will call to the bird. 
  
52.   
A) The girl will lie beside the diary. But first, she will read the diary. 
B) The girl will lie beside the diary. And then, she will read the diary. 
C) The girl will write in the diary. But first, she will read the diary. 
D) The girl will write in the diary. And then, she will read the diary. 
 
53. 
A) The housepainter will check the ladder. But first, he will walk around the ladder. 
B) The housepainter will check the ladder. And then, he will walk around the ladder. 
C) The housepainter will extend the ladder. But first, he will walk around the ladder. 
D) The housepainter will extend the ladder. And then, he will walk around the ladder. 
 
54. 
A) The ventriloquist will address the dummy. But first, he will make fun of the dummy. 
B) The ventriloquist will address the dummy. And then, he will make fun of the dummy. 
C) The ventriloquist will seat the dummy.  But first, he will make fun of the dummy. 
D) The ventriloquist will seat the dummy. And then, he will make fun of the dummy. 
 
55. 
A) The employee will stand beside the mannequin. But first, she will laugh at the 
mannequin. 
B) The employee will stand beside the mannequin. And then, she will laugh at the 
mannequin. 
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C) The employee will dress up the mannequin. But first, she will laugh at the mannequin. 
D) The employee will dress up the mannequin. And then, she will laugh at the 
mannequin. 
 
56. 
A) The customer will pick out the sunglasses.  But first, she will ask about the sunglasses. 
B) The customer will pick out the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about the sunglasses. 
C) The customer will fold up the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about the sunglasses. 
D) The customer will fold up the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about the sunglasses. 
 
57. 
A) The traveler will lay on the sleeping bag. But first, he will complain about the sleeping 
bag. 
B) The traveler will lay on the sleeping bag. And then, he will complain about the 
sleeping bag. 
C) The traveler will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will complain about the 
sleeping bag. 
D) The traveler will roll up the sleeping bag. And then, he will complain about the 
sleeping bag. 
 
58. 
A) The young woman will admire the jewelry box. But first, she will comment on the 
jewelry box. 
B) The young woman will admire the jewelry box. And then, she will comment on the 
jewelry box. 
C) The young woman will open the jewelry box. But first, she will comment on the 
jewelry box. 
D) The young woman will open the jewelry box. And then, she will comment on the 
jewelry box. 
 
59. 
A) The chef will weigh the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
B) The chef will weigh the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. 
C) The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
D) The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. 
 
60. 
A) The woman will inspect the cello. But first, she will kneel beside the cello. 
B) The woman will inspect the cello. And then, she will kneel beside the cello. 
C) The woman will restring the cello. But first, she will kneel beside the cello. 
D) The woman will restring the cello. And then, she will kneel beside the cello. 
 
61. 
A) The bully will pick on the boy. But first, he will shout at the boy. 
B) The bully will pick on the boy. And then, he will shout at the boy. 
C) The bully will knock down the boy. But first, he will shout at the boy. 
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D) The bully will knock down the boy. And then, he will shout at the boy. 
  
62.   
A) The passenger will clutch the seatbelt. But first, she will tug on the seatbelt. 
B) The passenger will clutch the seatbelt. And then, she will tug on the seatbelt. 
C) The passenger will buckle the seatbelt. But first, she will tug on the seatbelt. 
D) The passenger will buckle the seatbelt. And then, she will tug on the seatbelt. 
 
63. 
A) The grandmother will look toward the lamp. But first, she will ask about the lamp. 
B) The grandmother will look toward the lamp. And then, she will ask about the lamp. 
C) The grandmother will turn on the lamp. But first, she will ask about the lamp. 
D) The grandmother will turn on the lamp. And then, she will ask about the lamp. 
  
64. 
A) The child will poke at the rubber band. But first, he will grin at the rubber band. 
B) The child will poke at the rubber band. And then, he will grin at the rubber band. 
C) The child will stretch out the rubber band. But first, he will grin at the rubber band. 
D) The child will stretch out the rubber band. And then, he will grin at the rubber band. 
  
65. 
A) The butler will praise the rug. But first, he will step over the rug. 
B) The butler will praise the rug. And then, he will step over the rug. 
C) The butler will unroll the rug. But first, he will step over the rug. 
D) The butler will unroll the rug. And then, he will step over the rug. 
   
66. 
A) The student will sniff the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
B) The student will sniff the pizza. And then, he will blow on the pizza. 
C) The student will slice the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
D) The student will slice the pizza. And then, he will blow on the pizza. 
  
67. 
A) The escaped parrot will screech at the birdcage. But first, he will climb the birdcage. 
B) The escaped parrot will screech at the birdcage. And then, he will climb the birdcage. 
C) The escaped parrot will knock down the birdcage. But first, he will climb the birdcage. 
D) The escaped parrot will knock down the birdcage. And then, he will climb the 
birdcage. 
  
68. 
A) The athlete will sit beside the fan. But first, he will comment on the fan. 
B) The athlete will sit beside the fan. And then, he will comment on the fan. 
C) The athlete will turn on the fan. But first, he will comment on the fan. 
D) The athlete will turn on the fan. And then, he will comment on the fan. 
 
69. 
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A) The woman will peer behind the shower curtain. But first, she will frown at the 
shower curtain. 
B) The woman will peer behind the shower curtain. And then, she will frown at the 
shower curtain. 
C) The woman will hang up the shower curtain. But first, she will frown at the shower 
curtain. 
D) The woman will hang up the shower curtain. And then, she will frown at the shower 
curtain. 
  
70. 
A) The child will poke the gingerbread man. But first, she will laugh at the gingerbread 
man. 
B) The child will poke the gingerbread man. And then, she will laugh at the gingerbread 
man. 
C) The child will decorate the gingerbread man. But first, she will laugh at the 
gingerbread man. 
D) The child will decorate the gingerbread man. And then, she will laugh at the 
gingerbread man. 
 
71. 
A) The boy will inspect the kite. But first, he will compliment the kite. 
B) The boy will inspect the kite. And then, he will compliment the kite. 
C) The boy will unfold the kite. But first, he will compliment the kite. 
D) The boy will unfold the kite. And then, he will compliment the kite. 
  
72. 
A) The musician will look over the saxophone. But first, she will ask about the 
saxophone. 
B) The musician will look over the saxophone. And then, she will ask about the 
saxophone. 
C) The musician will strap on the saxophone. But first, she will ask about the saxophone. 
D) The musician will strap on the saxophone. And then, she will ask about the 
saxophone. 
 
73. 
A) The librarian will look at the book. But first, he will check out the book. 
B) The librarian will look at the book. And then, he will check out the book. 
C) The librarian will open up the book. But first, he will check out the book. 
D) The librarian will open up the book. And then, he will check out the book. 
 
74. 
A) The ninja will grip the sword. But first, he will grin at the sword. 
B) The ninja will grip the sword. And then, he will grin at the sword. 
C) The ninja will unsheathe the sword. But first, he will grin at the sword. 
D) The ninja will unsheathe the sword. And then, he will grin at the sword. 
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75. 
A) The barista will point to the latte. But first, she will ring up the latte. 
B) The barista will point to the latte. And then, she will ring up the latte. 
C) The barista will top off the latte. But first, she will ring up the latte. 
D) The barista will top off the latte. And then, she will ring up the latte. 
 
76. 
A) The artist will study the sculpture. But first, she will chat about the sculpture. 
B) The artist will study the sculpture. And then, she will chat about the sculpture. 
C) The artist will finish the sculpture. But first, she will chat about the sculpture. 
D) The artist will finish the sculpture. And then, she will chat about the sculpture. 
 
77. 
A) The traffic cop will follow the speeding motorist. But first, he will recognize the 
motorist. 
B) The traffic cop will follow the speeding motorist. And then, he will recognize the 
motorist. 
C) The traffic cop will stop the speeding motorist. But first, he will recognize the 
motorist. 
D) The traffic cop will stop the speeding motorist. And then, he will recognize the 
motorist. 
 
78. 
A) The flight attendant will locate the can of soda. But first, she will offer the can of 
soda. 
B) The flight attendant will locate the can of soda. And then, she will offer the can of 
soda. 
C) The flight attendant will open the can of soda. But first, she will offer the can of soda. 
D) The flight attendant will open the can of soda. And then, she will offer the can of soda. 
 
79. 
A) The food critic will taste the coffee. But first, he will ask about the coffee. 
B) The food critic will taste the coffee. And then, he will ask about the coffee. 
C) The food critic will finish the coffee. But first, he will ask about the coffee. 
D) The food critic will finish the coffee. And then, he will ask about the coffee. 
 
80. 
A) The carpenter will assess the floor. But first, he will step on the floor. 
B) The carpenter will assess the floor. And then, he will step on the floor. 
C) The carpenter will tile the floor. But first, he will step on the floor. 
D) The carpenter will tile the floor. And then, he will step on the floor. 
 
81. 
A) The man will lean on the dishwasher. But first, he will comment on the dishwasher. 
B) The man will lean on the dishwasher. And then, he will comment on the dishwasher. 
C) The man will take apart the dishwasher. But first, he will comment on the dishwasher. 
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D) The man will take apart the dishwasher. And then, he will comment on the dishwasher. 
 
82. 
A) The hairdresser will caress the wig. But first, he will compliment the wig. 
B) The hairdresser will caress the wig. And then, he will compliment the wig. 
C) The hairdresser will braid the wig. But first, he will compliment the wig. 
D) The hairdresser will braid the wig. And then, he will compliment the wig. 
 
83. 
A) The welder will clutch the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the blowtorch. 
B) The welder will clutch the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with the blowtorch. 
C) The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the blowtorch. 
D) The welder will light the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with the blowtorch. 
 
84. 
A) The girl will admire the flower. But first, she will sniff the flower. 
B) The girl will admire the flower. And then, she will sniff the flower. 
C) The girl will pluck the flower. But first, she will sniff the flower. 
D) The girl will pluck the flower. And then, she will sniff the flower. 
 
85. 
A) The man will kick the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
B) The man will kick the gate. And then, he will lean on the gate. 
C) The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
D) The man will shut the gate. And then, he will lean on the gate. 
 
86. 
A) The paleontologist will dig around the fossil. But first, he will talk about the fossil. 
B) The paleontologist will dig around the fossil. And then, he will talk about the fossil. 
C) The paleontologist will dig up the fossil. But first, he will talk about the fossil. 
D) The paleontologist will dig up the fossil. And then, he will talk about the fossil. 
 
87. 
A) The parking attendant will check the parking meter. But first, she will rest against the 
parking meter. 
B) The parking attendant will check the parking meter. And then, she will rest against the 
parking meter. 
C) The parking attendant will empty the parking meter. But first, she will rest against the 
parking meter. 
D) The parking attendant will empty the parking meter. And then, she will rest against the 
parking meter. 
 
88. 
A) The owl will swoop toward the field mouse. But first, it will hoot at the field mouse. 
B) The owl will swoop toward the field mouse. And then, it will hoot at the field mouse. 
C) The owl will scare away the field mouse. But first, it will hoot at the field mouse. 
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D) The owl will scare away the field mouse. And then, it will hoot at the field mouse. 
 
89. 
A) The camper will look into the tent. But first, he will chat about the tent. 
B) The camper will look into the tent. And then, he will chat about the tent. 
C) The camper will put together the tent. But first, he will chat about the tent. 
D) The camper will put together the tent. And then, he will chat about the tent. 
 
90. 
A) The exterminator will spot the cockroach. But first, he will talk about the cockroach. 
B) The exterminator will spot the cockroach. And then, he will talk about the cockroach. 
C) The exterminator will poison the cockroach. But first, he will talk about the 
cockroach. 
D) The exterminator will poison the cockroach. And then, he will talk about the 
cockroach. 
 
91. 
A) The scuba diver will peer through the diving mask. But first, he will tug at the diving 
mask. 
B) The scuba diver will peer through the diving mask. And then, he will tug at the diving 
mask. 
C) The scuba diver will wipe clear the diving mask. But first, he will tug at the diving 
mask. 
D) The scuba diver will wipe clear the diving mask. And then, he will tug at the diving 
mask. 
 
92. 
A) The dentist will prod the tooth. But first, he will talk about the tooth. 
B) The dentist will prod the tooth. And then, he will talk about the tooth. 
C) The dentist will remove the tooth. But first, he will talk about the tooth. 
D) The dentist will remove the tooth. And then, he will talk about the tooth. 
 
93. 
A) The airline pilot will steer the airplane. But first, he will talk about the airplane. 
B) The airline pilot will steer the airplane. And then, he will talk about the airplane. 
C) The airline pilot will land the airplane. But first, he will talk about the airplane. 
D) The airline pilot will land the airplane. And then, he will talk about the airplane. 
 
94. 
A) The mechanic will examine the car engine. But first, he will ask about the car engine. 
B) The mechanic will examine the car engine. And then, he will ask about the car engine. 
C) The mechanic will disassemble the car engine. But first, he will ask about the car 
engine. 
D) The mechanic will disassemble the car engine. And then, he will ask about the car 
engine. 
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95. 
A) The tailor will measure the pants. But first, he will ask about the pants. 
B) The tailor will measure the pants. And then, he will ask about the pants. 
C) The tailor will shorten the pants. But first, he will ask about the pants. 
D) The tailor will shorten the pants. And then, he will ask about the pants. 
 
96. 
A) The new employee will stare at the cash register. But first, he will ask about the cash 
register. 
B) The new employee will stare at the cash register. And then, he will ask about the cash 
register. 
C) The new employee will open up the cash register. But first, he will ask about the cash 
register. 
D) The new employee will open up the cash register. And then, he will ask about the cash 
register. 
 
97. 
A) The bicyclist will discover the flat tire. But first, she will complain about the tire. 
B) The bicyclist will discover the flat tire. And then, she will complain about the tire. 
C) The bicyclist will repair the flat tire. But first, she will complain about the tire. 
D) The bicyclist will repair the flat tire. And then, she will complain about the tire. 
 
98. 
A) The angry music conductor will squeeze the baton. But first, he will complain about 
the baton. 
B) The angry music conductor will squeeze the baton. And then, he will complain about 
the baton. 
C) The angry music conductor will snap the baton. But first, he will complain about the 
baton. 
D) The angry music conductor will snap the baton. And then, he will complain about the 
baton. 
 
99.   
A) The man will criticize the brochure. But first, he will read the brochure. 
B) The man will criticize the brochure. And then, he will read the brochure. 
C) The man will fold the brochure. But first, he will read the brochure. 
D) The man will fold the brochure. And then, he will read the brochure. 
 
100. 
A) The illustrator will copy the cartoon. But first, he will display the cartoon. 
B) The illustrator will copy the cartoon. And then, he will display the cartoon. 
C) The illustrator will color the cartoon. But first, he will display the cartoon. 
D) The illustrator will color the cartoon. And then, he will display the cartoon. 
 
101. 
A) The hunter will inspect the rifle. But first, he will frown at the rifle. 
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B) The hunter will inspect the rifle. And then, he will frown at the rifle. 
C) The hunter will load the rifle. But first, he will frown at the rifle. 
D) The hunter will load the rifle. And then, he will frown at the rifle. 
 
102. 
A) The woman will tap the table. But first, she will walk around the table. 
B) The woman will tap the table. And then, she will walk around the table. 
C) The woman will set the table. But first, she will walk around the table. 
D) The woman will set the table. And then, she will walk around the table. 
 
103. 
A) The grocer will weigh the blueberries. But first, he will smell the blueberries. 
B) The grocer will weigh the blueberries. And then, he will smell the blueberries. 
C) The grocer will blend the blueberries. But first, he will smell the blueberries. 
D) The grocer will blend the blueberries. And then, he will smell the blueberries. 
 
104. 
A) The man will touch the label. But first, he will read the label. 
B) The man will touch the label. And then, he will read the label. 
C) The man will remove the label. But first, he will read the label. 
D) The man will remove the label. And then, he will read the label. 
 
105. 
A) The gym teacher will slap the basketball. But first, he will comment on the basketball. 
B) The gym teacher will slap the basketball. And then, he will comment on the 
basketball. 
C) The gym teacher will inflate the basketball. But first, he will comment on the 
basketball. 
D) The gym teacher will inflate the basketball. And then, he will comment on the 
basketball. 
 
106. 
A) The contractor will measure the swimming pool. But first, he will walk around the 
pool. 
B) The contractor will measure the swimming pool. And then, he will walk around the 
pool. 
C) The contractor will drain the swimming pool. But first, he will walk around the pool. 
D) The contractor will drain the swimming pool. And then, he will walk around the pool. 
 
107. 
A) The dog will lie beside the homework. But first, he will smell the homework. 
B) The dog will lie beside the homework. And then, he will smell the homework. 
C) The dog will tear up the homework. But first, he will smell the homework. 
D) The dog will tear up the homework. And then, he will smell the homework. 
 
108. 
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A) The boy will swing at the piñata. But first, he will laugh at the piñata. 
B) The boy will swing at the piñata. And then, he will laugh at the piñata. 
C) The boy will knock down the piñata. But first, he will laugh at the piñata. 
D) The boy will knock down the piñata. And then, he will laugh at the piñata. 
 
109. 
A) The boy will show off the sand castle. But first, he will guard the sand castle. 
B) The boy will show off the sand castle. And then, he will guard the sand castle. 
C) The boy will finish up the sand castle. But first, he will guard the sand castle. 
D) The boy will finish up the sand castle. And then, he will guard the sand castle. 
 
110. 
A) The hyena will creep behind the wildebeest. But first, it will growl at the wildebeest. 
B) The hyena will creep behind the wildebeest. And then, it will growl at the wildebeest. 
C) The hyena will run down the wildebeest. But first, it will growl at the wildebeest. 
D) The hyena will run down the wildebeest. And then, it will growl at the wildebeest. 
 
111. 
A) The botanist will examine the plant. But first, he will document the plant. 
B) The botanist will examine the plant. And then, he will document the plant. 
C) The botanist will dissect the plant. But first, he will document the plant. 
D) The botanist will dissect the plant. And then, he will document the plant. 
 
112. 
A) The man will choose the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
B) The man will choose the bagel. And then, he will smell the bagel. 
C) The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
D) The man will slice the bagel. And then, he will smell the bagel. 
 
113.   
A) The girl will inspect the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about the gum. 
B) The girl will inspect the stick of gum. And then, she will complain about the gum. 
C) The girl will chew the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about the gum. 
D) The girl will chew the stick of gum. And then, she will complain about the gum. 
 
114. 
A) The trainer will pat the horse. But first, he will feed the horse. 
B) The trainer will pat the horse. And then, he will feed the horse. 
C) The trainer will saddle the horse. But first, he will feed the horse. 
D) The trainer will saddle the horse. And then, he will feed the horse. 
 
115. 
A) The woman will look into the baby carriage. But first, she will kneel beside the baby 
carriage. 
B) The woman will look into the baby carriage. And then, she will kneel beside the baby 
carriage. 
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C) The woman will fold up the baby carriage. But first, she will kneel beside the baby 
carriage. 
D) The woman will fold up the baby carriage. And then, she will kneel beside the baby 
carriage. 
 
116. 
A) The man will check the wristwatch. But first, he will brag about the wristwatch. 
B) The man will check the wristwatch. And then, he will brag about the wristwatch. 
C) The man will reset the wristwatch. But first, he will brag about the wristwatch. 
D) The man will reset the wristwatch. And then, he will brag about the wristwatch. 
 
117. 
A) The man will look for the cell phone. But first, he will gripe about the cell phone. 
B) The man will look for the cell phone. And then, he will gripe about the cell phone. 
C) The man will put away the cell phone. But first, he will gripe about the cell phone. 
D) The man will put away the cell phone. And then, he will gripe about the cell phone. 
 
118. 
A) The boy will wait beside the Halloween costume. But first, he will ask for the 
costume. 
B) The boy will wait beside the Halloween costume. And then, he will ask for the 
costume. 
C) The boy will try on the Halloween costume. But first, he will ask for the costume. 
D) The boy will try on the Halloween costume. And then, he will ask for the costume. 
 
119. 
A) The grandfather will look at the Thanksgiving turkey. But first, he will walk around 
the turkey. 
B) The grandfather will look at the Thanksgiving turkey. And then, he will walk around 
the turkey. 
C) The grandfather will cut up the Thanksgiving turkey. But first, he will walk around the 
turkey. 
D) The grandfather will cut up the Thanksgiving turkey. And then, he will walk around 
the turkey. 
 
120. 
A) The woman will count the potatoes. But first, she will talk about the potatoes. 
B) The woman will count the potatoes. And then, she will talk about the potatoes. 
C) The woman will mash the potatoes. But first, she will talk about the potatoes. 
D) The woman will mash the potatoes. And then, she will talk about the potatoes. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Experiment 2 event comprehension items (object varied, action fixed.. Full stimulus 
set of 100 items. Each subject saw each item in only one of the two conditions. All 
items contain the same verb in both conditions. Items 1-60 are matched across 
conditions as closely as possible on the specific action connotation of the verb. 
 
A = action minimally changes object 
B = action substantially changes object 
 
1. 
A) The girl will stomp on the penny. And then, she will look down at the penny. 
B) The girl will stomp on the egg. And then, she will look down at the egg. 
 
2. 
A) The girl will jump on the soft grass. And then, she will ask about the grass. 
B) The girl will jump on the cardboard box. And then, she will ask about the box. 
 
3. 
A) The teenager will drop the beach ball. And then, she will run away from the beach 
ball. 
B) The teenager will drop the mayonnaise jar. And then, she will run away from the 
mayonnaise jar. 
 
4.  
A) The marksman will shoot at the old worn-out target. And then, he will point at the 
target. 
B) The marksman will shoot at the brand new target. And then, he will point at the target. 
 
5. 
A) The girl will lick the heart-shaped lollipop. And then, she will put down the lollipop. 
B) The girl will lick the postage stamp. And then, she will put down the stamp. 
 
6. 
A) The maid will scrub the pristine bathtub. And then, she will admire the bathtub. 
B) The maid will scrub the grimy bathtub. And then, she will admire the bathtub. 
 
7. 
A) The angry boxer will punch the training bag. And then, he will glare at the training 
bag. 
B) The angry boxer will punch the fatigued opponent. And then, he will glare at the 
fatigued opponent. 
 
8. 
A) The girl will pinch the Beanie Baby. And then, she will inspect the Beanie Baby. 
B) The girl will pinch the Silly Putty. And then, she will inspect the Silly Putty. 
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9. 
A) The man will squeeze the tennis ball. And then, he will frown at the tennis ball. 
B) The man will squeeze the lemon wedge. And then, he will frown at the lemon wedge. 
 
10. 
A) The woman will sit on the leather couch cushion. And then, she will ask about the 
couch cushion. 
B) The woman will sit on the inflated whoopee cushion. And then, she will ask about the 
whoopee cushion. 
 
11. 
A) The boy will step on the heavily trodden snow. And then, he will enjoy the snow. 
B) The boy will step on the newly fallen snow. And then, he will enjoy the snow. 
 
12. 
A) The girl will stick her finger through the doughnut. And then, she will grin at the 
doughnut. 
B) The girl will stick her finger through the cupcake. And then, she will grin at the 
cupcake. 
 
13. 
A) The woman will soak the damp washcloth. And then, she will inspect the washcloth. 
B) The woman will soak the dry sponge. And then, she will inspect the sponge. 
 
14. 
A) The woman will heat up the frying pan. And then, she will wait beside the frying pan. 
B) The woman will heat up the chocolate fondue. And then, she will wait beside the 
fondue. 
 
15. 
A) The groomer will brush the horse’s shiny coat. And then, she will comment on the 
horse’s coat. 
B) The groomer will brush the horse’s tangled mane. And then, she will comment on the 
horse’s mane. 
 
16. 
A) The man will shake the empty champagne bottle. And then, he will joke about the 
champagne bottle. 
B) The man will shake the unopened champagne bottle. And then, he will joke about the 
champagne bottle. 
 
17. 
A) The girl will kick the wall. And then, she will yell at the wall. 
B) The girl will kick the football. And then, she will yell at the football. 
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18. 
A) The girl will push on the granite statue. And then, she will walk away from the granite 
statue. 
B) The girl will push on the desk chair. And then, she will walk away from the desk chair. 
 
19. 
A) The teenager will tip over the empty pudding container. And then, she will reach for 
the container. 
B) The teenager will tip over the bowl of oatmeal. And then, she will reach for the 
oatmeal. 
 
20. 
A) The dog will chomp on the durable rawhide. And then, it will spit out the rawhide. 
B) The dog will chomp on the soft treat. And then, it will spit out the treat. 
 
21. 
A) The girl will drop the deflated birthday balloon. And then, she will laugh about the 
birthday balloon. 
B) The girl will drop the giant water balloon. And then, she will laugh about the water 
balloon. 
 
22. 
A) The dog will tug on the leather leash. And then, it will look back at the leash. 
B) The dog will tug on the retractable leash. And then, it will look back at the leash. 
 
23. 
A) The farmer will prod the cow carcass. And then, he will complain about the carcass. 
B) The farmer will prod the sleeping rooster. And then, he will complain about the 
rooster. 
 
24. 
A) The student will lie on the firm mattress. And then, she will get off of the mattress. 
B) The student will lie on the new waterbed. And then, she will get off of the waterbed. 
 
25. 
A) The trainer will splash the dolphin. And then, she will watch the dolphin. 
B) The trainer will splash the cat. And then, she will watch the cat. 
 
26. 
A) The toddler will poke the action figure. And then, he will inspect the action figure. 
B) The toddler will poke the bobble-head doll. And then, he will inspect the bobble-head 
doll. 
 
27. 
A) The child will knock over the hard plastic cup. And then, he will run away from the 
cup. 
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B) The child will knock over the delicate flower vase. And then, he will run away from 
the vase. 
 
28. 
A) The child will squeeze the stress ball. And then, he will talk about the ball. 
B) The child will squeeze the dried-up leaf. And then, he will talk about the leaf. 
 
29. 
A) The child will drop the soccer ball. And then, he will stand over the ball. 
B) The child will drop the fragile ornament. And then, he will stand over the ornament. 
 
30. 
A) The girl will plug the empty bathtub. And then, she will walk away from the bathtub. 
B) The girl will plug the draining bathtub. And then, she will walk away from the 
bathtub. 
 
31. 
A) The waiter will wipe the clean wine glass. And then, he will put down the wine glass. 
B) The waiter will wipe the dirty wine glass. And then, he will put down the wine glass. 
 
32. 
A) The kitten will claw the scratching post. And then, it will hiss at the post. 
B) The kitten will claw the new curtains. And then, it will hiss at the curtains. 
 
33. 
A) The teenager will drive over the speed bump. And then, she will look back at the 
speed bump. 
B) The teenager will drive over the new skateboard. And then, she will look back at the 
skateboard. 
 
34. 
A) The man will lean on the sturdy fence. And then, he will grumble about the fence. 
B) The man will lean on the precarious ladder. And then, he will grumble about the 
ladder. 
 
35. 
A) The toddler will splash the rubber ducky. And then, she will pick up the rubber ducky.  
B) The toddler will splash the paper towel. And then, she will pick up the paper towel. 
 
36. 
A) The karate instructor will kick the foam pad. And then, he will hold up the pad. 
B) The karate instructor will kick the wooden board. And then, he will hold up the board. 
 
37. 
A) The boy will pound the wooden table. And then, he will walk away from the table. 
B) The boy will pound the wet clay. And then, he will walk away from the clay. 
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38. 
A) The servant will fan the queen. And then, he will wait by the queen. 
B) The servant will fan the fire. And then, he will wait by the fire. 
 
39. 
A) The toddler will squeeze the Barbie doll. And then, she will laugh at the Barbie doll. 
B) The toddler will squeeze the frosting tube. And then, she will laugh at the frosting 
tube. 
 
40. 
A) The dog will lick its large furry paw. And then, it will sniff its paw. 
B) The dog will lick the ice cream sundae. And then, it will sniff the sundae. 
 
41. 
A) The student will tap the wooden desk. And then, she will sit behind the desk. 
B) The student will tap her sleeping friend. And then, she will sit behind her friend. 
 
42. 
A) The boy will shake the empty ketchup bottle. And then, he will hold the ketchup 
bottle. 
B) The boy will shake the carbonated soft drink. And then, he will hold the soft drink. 
 
43. 
A) The waves will crash on the rock. And then, they will recede away from the rock. 
B) The waves will crash on the sandcastle. And then, they will recede away from the 
sandcastle. 
 
44. 
A) The boy will stomp on the hardwood floor. And then, he will look down at the floor. 
B) The boy will stomp on the cheap sunglasses. And then, he will look down at the 
sunglasses. 
 
45. 
A) The boy will bite down on the hard plastic mouthguard. And then, he will complain 
about the mouthguard. 
B) The boy will bite down on the dental impression putty. And then, he will complain 
about the putty. 
 
46. 
A) The chef will boil the silverware. And then, she will complain about the silverware. 
B) The chef will boil the spaghetti. And then, she will complain about the spaghetti. 
 
47. 
A) The hornet will sting the scarecrow. And then, it will circle around the scarecrow. 
B) The hornet will sting the person. And then, it will circle around the person. 
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48. 
A) The man will bump into the sofa. And then, he will stand beside the sofa. 
B) The man will bump into the chandelier. And then, he will stand beside the chandelier. 
 
49. 
A) The hiker will drop the metal canteen. And then, she will reach for the canteen. 
B) The hiker will drop the delicate camera. And then, she will reach for the camera. 
 
50. 
A) The girl will blow on the dice. And then, she will smile about the dice. 
B) The girl will blow on the dandelion. And then, she will smile about the dandelion. 
 
51. 
A) The girl will step on the pebble. And then, she will notice the pebble. 
B) The girl will step on the spider. And then, she will notice the spider. 
 
52. 
A) The man will microwave the coffee. And then, he will smell the coffee. 
B) The man will microwave the popcorn. And then, he will smell the popcorn. 
 
53. 
A) The girl will drop the binder. And then, she will frown at the binder. 
B) The girl will drop the laptop. And then, she will frown at the laptop. 
 
54. 
A) The puppy will gnaw on the lamb bone. And then, it will carry the lamb bone. 
B) The puppy will gnaw on the stuffed animal. And then, it will carry the stuffed animal. 
 
55. 
A) The boy will shake up the empty water bottle. And then, he will put down the bottle. 
B) The boy will shake up the settled orange juice. And then, he will put down the juice. 
 
56. 
A) The squirrel will hang on to the branch. And then, it will scamper away from the 
branch. 
B) The squirrel will hang on to the clothesline. And then, it will scamper away from the 
clothesline. 
 
57. 
A) The bank robber will shoot at the armored vehicle. And then, he will run away from 
the vehicle. 
B) The bank robber will shoot at the glass window. And then, he will run away from the 
window. 
 
58. 
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A) The man will step on the cloth doormat. And then, he will look down at the doormat. 
B) The man will step on the beer can. And then, he will look down at the can. 
 
59. 
A) The girl will poke the teddy bear. And then, she will laugh about the teddy bear. 
B) The girl will poke the card tower. And then, she will laugh about the card tower. 
 
60. 
A) The maid will sweep the spotless floor. And then, she will stand on the floor. 
B) The maid will sweep the dusty floor. And then, she will stand on the floor. 
 
61. 
A) The man will let go of the empty shopping cart. And then, he will look at the cart. 
B) The man will let go of the compressed metal spring. And then, he will look at the 
spring. 
 
62. 
A) The boy will suck on the soup spoon. And then, he will spit out the soup spoon. 
B) The boy will suck on the ice cube. And then, he will spit out the ice cube. 
 
63. 
A) The woman will heat up the plates. And then, she will chat about the plates. 
B) The woman will heat up the water. And then, she will chat about the water. 
 
64. 
A) The horse will flick its tail. And then, it will look toward its tail. 
B) The horse will flick the mosquito. And then, it will look toward the mosquito. 
 
65. 
A) The woman will beat the rug. And then, she will look closely at the rug. 
B) The woman will beat the egg. And then, she will look closely at the egg. 
 
66. 
A) The girl will pluck the guitar. And then, she will hold on to the guitar. 
B) The girl will pluck the flower. And then, she will hold on to the flower. 
 
67. 
A) The boy will push the closed bathroom door. And then, he will frown at the door. 
B) The boy will push the lined up dominoes. And then, he will frown at the dominoes. 
 
68. 
A) The girl will poke the bunny rabbit doll. And then, she will laugh about the doll. 
B) The girl will poke the chewing gum bubble. And then, she will laugh about the bubble. 
 
69. 
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A) The man will chew the old mechanical pencil. And then, he will complain about the 
pencil. 
B) The man will chew the piece of chicken. And then, he will complain about the 
chicken. 
 
70. 
A) The boy will bite his nails. And then, he will examine his nails. 
B) The boy will bite the plum. And then, he will examine the plum. 
 
71. 
A) The chef will warm up the broccoli. And then, he will wait beside the broccoli. 
B) The chef will warm up the butter. And then, he will wait beside the butter. 
 
72. 
A) The teenager will drive through the giant tunnel. And then, she will look back at the 
tunnel. 
B) The teenager will drive through the giant puddle. And then, she will look back at the 
puddle. 
 
73. 
A) The boy will pull on the stuck window. And then, he will complain about the stuck 
window. 
B) The boy will pull on the elastic band. And then, he will complain about the elastic 
band.  
 
74. 
A) The boy will crash the bumper car. And then, he will complain about the bumper car. 
B) The boy will crash the remote-controlled car. And then, he will complain about the 
remote-controlled car. 
 
75. 
A) The woman will press the broken piano key. And then, she will ask about the piano 
key. 
B) The woman will press the wrinkled dress shirt. And then, she will ask about the dress 
shirt. 
 
76. 
A) The woman will crush the pillow. And then, she will pick up the pillow. 
B) The woman will crush the ice. And then, she will pick up the ice. 
 
77. 
A) The girl will bend her knees. And then, she will complain about her knees. 
B) The girl will bend the paperclip. And then, she will complain about the paperclip. 
 
78. 
A) The boy will jiggle the bathroom door handle. And then, he will frown at the handle. 
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B) The boy will jiggle the stacked soda cans. And then, he will frown at the cans. 
 
79. 
A) The boy will step on to the tennis court. And then, he will walk off the court. 
B) The boy will step on to the wet cement. And then, he will walk off the cement. 
 
80. 
A) The man will smoke the pipe. And then, he will comment on the pipe. 
B) The man will smoke the cigar. And then, he will comment on the cigar. 
 
81. 
A) The girl will spin the colorful globe. And then, she will display the colorful globe. 
B) The girl will spin the cotton candy. And then, she will display the cotton candy. 
 
82. 
A) The girl will squeeze her boyfriend’s arm. And then, she will hold on to her 
boyfriend’s arm. 
B) The girl will squeeze the tube of toothpaste. And then, she will hold on to the tube of 
toothpaste. 
 
83. 
A) The man will flip the silver coin. And then, he will look closely at the coin. 
B) The man will flip the half-done pancake. And then, he will look closely at the pancake. 
 
84. 
A) The girl will roll her eyes. And then, she will ask about her eyes. 
B) The girl will roll the burrito. And then, she will ask about the burrito. 
 
85. 
A) The man will grill the suspect. And then, he will frown at the suspect. 
B) The man will grill the pork. And then, he will frown at the pork. 
 
86. 
A) The boy will scratch his head. And then, he will complain about his head. 
B) The boy will scratch the CD) And then, he will complain about the CD. 
 
87. 
A) The man will wind up the broken toy car. And then, he will complain about the toy 
car. 
B) The man will wind up the knotted fishing line. And then, he will complain about the 
fishing line. 
 
88. 
A) The boy will scrape the pavement. And then, he will frown at the pavement. 
B) The boy will scrape his knee. And then, he will frown at his knee. 
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89. 
A) The boy will yank the rope swing. And then, he will comment on the swing. 
B) The boy will yank the loose tooth. And then, he will comment on the tooth. 
 
90. 
A) The man will type on the new computer. And then, he will complain about the 
computer. 
B) The man will type on the tax form. And then, he will complain about the form. 
 
91. 
A) The gymnast will curl the large heavy weight. And then, she will stare at the weight. 
B) The gymnast will curl her long straight hair. And then, she will stare at her hair. 
 
92. 
A) The woman will roll her tongue. And then, she will admire her tongue. 
B) The woman will roll the sushi. And then, she will admire the sushi. 
 
93. 
A) The woman will scratch the mosquito bite. And then, she will frown at the mosquito 
bite. 
B) The woman will scratch the lottery ticket. And then, she will frown at the lottery 
ticket. 
 
94. 
A) The boy will pick his nose. And then, he will complain about his nose. 
B) The boy will pick the scab. And then, he will complain about the scab. 
 
95. 
A) The man will snap the leather whip. And then, he will examine the whip. 
B) The man will snap the plastic ruler. And then, he will examine the ruler. 
 
96. 
A) The boy will slap the basketball. And then, he will look at the basketball. 
B) The boy will slap the grasshopper. And then, he will look at the grasshopper. 
 
97. 
A) The woman will check the parking meter. And then, she will ask about the parking 
meter. 
B) The woman will check the answer box. And then, she will ask about the answer box. 
 
98. 
A) The man will chew on the plastic toothpick. And then, he will comment on the plastic 
toothpick. 
B) The man will chew on the carrot stick. And then, he will comment on the carrot stick. 
 
99. 
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A) The woman will deliver the mail. And then, she will talk about the mail. 
B) The woman will deliver the baby. And then, she will talk about the baby. 
 
100. 
A) The woman will grind her teeth. And then, she will talk about her teeth. 
B) The woman will grind the pepper. And then, she will talk about the pepper. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Experiment 3 state-change comprehension items Each subject saw each item in only 
one of the two conditions.  
 
A = action minimally changes object 
B = action substantially changes object 
 
1. A) sniff the flower   B) pluck the flower 
    
2. A) yell at the jack-in-the-box  B) pop open the jack-in-the-box 
    
3. A) reach for the apple   B) bite into the apple 
  
4. A) smile at the candy bar  B) unwrap the candy bar 
       
5. A) feel the egg   B) crack open the egg 
     
6. A) grip the hose   B) unravel the hose 
    
7. A) ask about the banana  B) peel the banana 
    
8. A) reach for the shoe   B) tie the shoe 
    
9. A) tap on the blackboard  B) draw on the blackboard 
    
10. A) comment on the umbrella  B) open the umbrella 
                  
11. A) measure the jump rope  B) cut up the jump rope 
     
12. A) skim through the essay  B) mark up the essay 
    
13. A) laugh at the cartoon  B) color in the cartoon 
    
14. A) count the potatoes   B) mash the potatoes 
   
15. A) ask about the book   B) open up the book 
     
16. A) gripe about the bed  B) make up the bed 
    
17. A) weigh the pumpkin  B) carve the pumpkin 
    
18. A) sit in front of the candle  B) blow out the candle 
             
19. A) pick up the balloon  B) inflate the balloon 
     
 
 
131 
 
20. A) marvel at the puzzle  B) break apart the puzzle 
    
21. A) stand beside the mannequin B) dress up the mannequin 
    
22. A) step over the sleeping bag  B) roll up the sleeping bag 
    
23. A) touch the jewelry box  B) open the jewelry box  
     
24. A) sniff the onion   B) chop the onion 
    
25. A) sit next to the lamp  B) turn off the lamp 
    
26. A) step over the rug   B) unroll the rug 
     
27. A) blow on the pizza   B) slice the pizza 
    
28. A) touch the gingerbread man B) decorate the gingerbread man 
    
29. A) tap the wine glass   B) crack the wine glass 
    
30. A) point at the tree   B) chop down the tree 
    
31. A) peer into the tent   B) take apart the tent 
    
32. A) bang on the cash register  B) open up the cash register 
    
33. A) touch the canvas   B) paint on the canvas 
    
34. A) tap on the table   B) set the table 
    
35. A) kneel beside the window  B) open up the window 
    
36. A) walk around the pool  B) drain the pool 
    
37. A) point at the piñata   B) knock down the piñata 
    
38. A) smell the bagel   B) slice the bagel 
       
39. A) kneel beside the baby carriage B) fold up the baby carriage 
   
40. A) poke at the turkey   B) cut up the turkey 
 
